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Executive Summary 
The scientific staff of NADEL, MAS ETH in Development and Cooperation, undertook study 
tours to Tanzania and Mali in early July 2006 in order to analyse pro-poor decentralisation poli-
cies and the role civil society organisations play. This report summarises the findings from Tan-
zania. 
The visit to Tanzania included discussions in Dar es Salaam with a wide spectrum of stake-
holders representing international and local civil society as well as government organisations 
involved in the decentralisation and local governance reform. The study tour included a visit to 
Dodoma (capital of Tanzania) and field visits in the Kagera Region (Bukoba and Muleba Dis-
tricts) and the Kongwa District.  
Main conclusions can be summarised as follows: 
General: Tanzania has seen several decentralisation eras, some with devastating conse-
quences. The most recent decentralisation era (since 2000) aims at devolving political powers 
from central government to local government authorities by the decentralisation-by-devolution 
principle (D-by-D). This is implemented with some difficulty and at a rather slow pace, and has 
not achieved its high expectations. The cooperation of state actors with the civil society organi-
sations (CSOs) has improved and parallel to the shift towards budget support donors provide 
programm support to CSOs. There is a gradual shift of some donors to support more umbrella 
CSOs, which however, have rather weak linkages to the local level. 
Political decentralisation: While there seems to be some resistance at the level of central minis-
tries to devolve power, the centrally appointed executives play a decisive role at regional and 
district level, and often are more experienced and powerful than the elected councillors. There 
has been considerable progress at local level to introduce participatory planning mechanisms 
and to enhance the knowledge on the principles of D-by-D among local officials and the popula-
tion in general. CSOs at all levels are playing an important role in strengthening the capacity of 
local actors to gradually transform the D-by-D discourse and participation into reality.  
Administrative decentralisation: Contrary to the goals of decentralisation, staff and officials of 
local government authorities are still under a considerable degree of control by central govern-
ment. Some central ministries are maintaining parallel procedures in order to continue central-
ised human resource management for certain categories of staff such as teachers. In spite of 
huge efforts to train LGA staff, officials and the population in general, limited capacity of human 
resources at local level still seems to be the major bottleneck for implementing area-wide de-
centralisation and participatory planning. Civil society organisations are particularly important for 
demanding local government authorities to respect and fulfil the principles of good governance 
such as transparency, accountability, fighting corruption and so on.  
Fiscal decentralisation: Among the three decentralisation spheres substantial progress has 
been made by making transfers from central government to LGAs more transparent and they 
have substantially increased in recent years. However, the dependency from the centre grew as 
a result of the abolition of some local taxes in 2004. The shortage of funds (and capacity) at 
local level is a major bottleneck for efficient planning and execution. Civil society has a major 
role (also acknowledged by the government) to track performance at local level in order to in-
crease accountability of locally elected council members and representatives of ministries as 
well. There is scope to systematically engage CSOs in the budgetary and expenditure review 
process, which requires a strengthening of the will and technical ability for exchanging and ana-
lysing planning and financial information on both sides, the LGAs as well as the CSOs. 
Further research: Poverty reduction outside of the capital Dar es Saalam has been marginal 
between 1991 and 2001. There are no recent figures available that would coincide with the lat-
est decentralisation era to attribute poverty reductions with the recent decentralisation efforts. 
Within the scope of this exploratory study it was also not possible to assess the impact of the 
strengthened civil society participation on pro-poor decentralisation. The forthcoming Household 
and Budget Survey (planned for 2006) will provide a data base for analysing the role of CSOs 
and the governance performance at district level in the light of progress in poverty alleviation.
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1.  Introduction 
1.1 Conceptual Background 
Governance and principles of good governance have emerged as an important topic of devel-
opment policy since 1990. Yet the concept of what the essence of governance is remains multi-
facetted till now (Pierre/Peters 2000). Similarly, the issue of decentralisation and the potentials 
to reduce poverty and to increase good governance at the sub-national level by decentralising 
responsibilities and resources have become key issues in development policy in recent years 
(Jütting 2005). In many developing countries decentralisation efforts have been planned and 
implemented as a means to improve service delivery to all citizens (incl. the poor), to increase 
participation of the citizens and to improve good governance at the sub-national level in general. 
Poverty reduction on the other side has not been at the centre of decentralisation measures 
until recently. An OECD analysis (Jütting 2004, 2005) illustrated that fiscal, political and admin-
istrative decentralisation does not alleviate poverty automatically unless a number of critical 
factors are met. If decentralisation is to have an impact on poverty reduction, then the following 
preconditions should be met: a strong commitment from the centre is required, decentralisation 
must be embedded in a broader reform programme, policy making processes should be trans-
parent, regular democratic elections are required, broad civic participation is needed, and a high 
level of information sharing among all stakeholders must be ensured.  
Concurrently to these debates civil society has emerged as an important stakeholder. Donors 
have realised the importance and value of these non-state actors to improve the effectiveness 
of the state. The increasing importance of the concept of civil society during the past 15 years is 
seen as one of the most significant trends in international development (World Bank). Interna-
tional NGOs as well as mushrooming networks of local NGOs, producer associations and in-
formal community based organisations have begun to play an increasingly important role in ex-
panding local service delivery capacity, demanding transparency and accountability, and advo-
cating rights in various sectoral fields (education, water, etc.) as well as cross cutting issues 
such as human rights and cultural issues. Civil society participation is perceived to be indispen-
sable to assure need-based planning and implementation of activities at local level and to 
strengthen accountability of local governments to their citizens. 
There is no consistent, generally accepted definition of the concepts of Local and/or Good Gov-
ernance, Decentralisation, Poverty and Civil Society in the growing literature. All concepts are 
redefined under different contexts or disciplines and they are continuously reshaped in the de-
bate. For the sake of a clear understanding, in this paper we use the terms as follows:  
Civil Society: The World Bank defines Civil Society as “a wide array of non-governmental and 
not for profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and val-
ues of their members or others, based on ethnical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or phil-
anthropic considerations. 
Decentralisation as per Jütting (2004) is defined as “…. a transfer of public functions from 
higher tiers to lower tiers of governance. It can be administrative, fiscal, political or a mixture of 
these.”  
Governance as per UNDP (1997) means „the exercise of economic, political and administrative 
authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes 
and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interest, exercise legal rights, 
meet their obligations and mediate their differences." Good governance as per BMZ (2002) in-
cludes five criteria, such as (1) respect for human rights, (2) popular participation in political 
decision-making, (3) rule of law and certainty of the law, (4) a market friendly and social eco-
nomic order, and (5) development oriented state action aimed at sustainable development, fight 
against corruption and efficient public administration. 
Poverty is a multi-dimensional concept, which the DAC/OECD (2001) defines by five dimen-
sions (1) political: rights, freedom, influence; (2) socio-cultural: status, dignity; (3) human: 
health, education, nutrition; (4) economic: consumption, income, assets; and (5) protective: se-
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curity and vulnerability. These five dimensions are supplemented by two cross cutting aspects: 
gender and the environment. 
The governance concepts do not only apply to states – consolidated or fragile ones – but go 
beyond. In this regard, the EU uses the term multi-level governance to describe the relation 
between the EU and its member states. Similarly, debates about world trade and the interna-
tional war on terrorism have raised the awareness that (good) governance issues are closely 
related to globalisation and global security issues. Thus the subject of governance and “optimal” 
decentralisation is closely intertwined with the process of the emergence of global markets, in-
ternational competition, and global security issues. Bottom-up innovations and advocacy work 
can alter the policy and institutional arrangements on how state and non state actors cooperate 
and compete within a multi-level governance system. 
 
1.2 Hypothesis and Key Questions  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relations between these concepts and recent policy 
developments in the context of Tanzania. This context is characterised by the existence of an 
explicit decentralisation reform launched in 2000, the second national framework for growth and 
poverty reduction (Mkukuta) launched in 2005, and increased efforts for donor harmonisation 
which has shifted the aid delivery mode in favour of sector and budget support. As a result the 
government has received a much more prominent role compared to the civil society. 
The hypothesis to be tested is that broad participation of civil society organisations, represent-
ing the various social and ethnic segments of the local population, is essential for pro-poor de-
centralisation. The analysis includes the whole variety of civil society organisations ranging from 
international NGOs operating from their headquarters in the North, over international NGOs 
operating from a strong local basis or through local affiliates, local urban NGOs that have not 
much in common with the rural poor, to a broad choice of producer or credit associations and 
informal community based groups.  
The basic question to be answered is “How can civil society organisations (CSOs) of Tan-
zania influence pro-poor decentralisation?” Specific questions were formulated to gauge civil 
society’s influence in setting the decentralisation agenda, in providing crucial basic services 
(e.g. health) or to which extent CSOs advocate the rural poor about their rights and obligations. 
Questions also relate to the extent to which the decentralisation process has been able to re-
duce poverty in Tanzania. The underlying conceptual frame and the questions used during the 
interviews are attached in Annex A. 
 
1.3 Methodology, Scope and Limitations 
The analysis included a review of relevant documents (see Annex B), a two weeks’ mission to 
Tanzania which included interviews with major stakeholders in the decentralisation and local 
governance reform process. These included representatives of the government at the various 
levels, donors, international NGOs, Tanzanian NGOs, local groups as well as private sector 
representatives (see Annex C). 
The visit included a trip to the Dodoma Region and specifically the Kongwa District (see map 
and key figures in Annex D), which was used as a brief case study on how planning, implemen-
tation and evaluation of development activities are conducted at the local governance level. The 
selection of this region in Tanzania was based on the SDC Country Programme 2004 – 2010 
which has introduced a reorientation of the Swiss interventions at micro and meso level to the 
Central corridor as a result of a more prominent poverty oriented focus.1  
                                                
1  The new region had to figure among the country’s lower 50 % in terms of poverty status, underserved by 
donors in the intended domains, be reasonably accessible and they should have some economic potential 
(SDC 2004). 
 3 
The role of civil society in decentralisation in Tanzania 
Prior to the two weeks’ NADEL mission, one of the authors (Walter Egli) made a field trip to Bu-
koba and Muleba Districts to visit projects implemented by the Swiss NGO Swissaid and its 
partner organisation FOGOTA (Forum for Grassroots Organisations of Tanzania). While the 
purpose of the visit was to know the results of Swissaid project activities, issues of decentralisa-
tion were discussed with their staff and beneficiaries, and meetings took place with district offi-
cials at Muleba. 
The analysis is purely based on a case study approach applying qualitative interview methods 
and using secondary data sources. This exploratory study should be seen as a first step in view 
of a broader cooperation with Tanzanian partners. All omissions, generalisations, factual mis-
takes and possible misunderstandings are the responsibility of the authors. 
 4
The role of civil society in decentralisation in Tanzania 
2. Decentralisation Background in Tanzania 
2.1 Political and Administrative Structure and Processes 
Tanzania has a five level governance system including village, ward, district, region and central 
levels. The main characteristics of these governance levels are provided in Annex E. In terms of 
developmental activities, the centre, the district and the village play the decisive roles in deci-
sion making and implementation of activities, whereas the ward and regional level mainly have 
functions to coordinate and to assure compliance with overall national strategies. 
The independence of the executive, the legislative and the judiciary is contested in the litera-
ture. Based on our interviews, it is concluded that the academia and to a major extent the media 
are fairly independent. However, many crucial positions at the local governance level, were and 
still are centrally appointed positions (e.g. Regional and District Commissioners). The political 
processes in Tanzania are very much shaped by the CCM party which has been in power since 
independence in 1963. The ruling party obtained 80 % of the seats in the parliament and 98 % 
of the seats at local government level in the past elections (2005) giving it a comfortable major-
ity. The recent parliamentary debate was quite vivid and especially the (few) opposition mem-
bers questioned the proposed budgets from all angles. The critical debates about the allocation 
criteria of scarce resources were reflected in newspapers. 
Two recent papers have more thoroughly analysed the power structure in Tanzania. Heyden 
(2005) characterized the politics as relying on personal “deals”, where trust is confined to face-
to-face arrangements, in rural areas but also in urban areas. This important role which informal 
institutions play was phrased as “economy of affection” where exchange is not based on con-
tracts but on consensus, ambiguity and reciprocity. The development partners (i.e. donors) have 
recently mandated a series of analysis about the accountability structures in Tanzania (REPOA 
/ OPM / CMI 2005). The studies applied a bottom up and a top down perspective respectively 
and the main conclusions were: 
 
Top-down perspective Bottom-up perspective 
 Weak structure of checks and balances. The 
power structure is dominated by the Presi-
dency, the Executive and the CCM Party 
 The Executive has a dominant role in setting 
the budgets, the Parliament has a rather for-
malistic oversight 
 Limited ability of NGOs, media or other inter-
est groups to play a corrective role 
 The introduction of an Integrated Finance 
Management System and related mecha-
nisms have reduced scope for spending out-
side the approved budget 
 The budget process remains opaque because 
of inadequate transparency, delays in audit 
reports and not user friendly information. 
 The strong oral tradition at local level limits the 
degree of answerability and controllability 
 Faith based organisations were considered to 
be the best performing and most credible 
partners 
 In practice, a complex web of cooperation and 
overlapping between governmental and social 
institutions exist (-> no shortage of account-
ability mechanisms at local level) 
 In rural areas, the patriarchal mode of decision 
making dominates  
 The ability to acquire and disburse funds is an 
important qualification for councillors  
 Significant improvements can be expected 
from better transparency (-> there is rather a 
shortage of resources than resource leakage) 
 
“Policy making is top down and dominated by donors, investors and bureaucrats in that order” 
was the conclusion by Prof. Mukandala (DPGWG 2005), when he reiterated the importance to 
support state and popular institutions which perform oversight functions. Despite the progress in 
the transition process, he identified weaknesses in raising the popular voice in the public arena 
although there is a growing openness and less timidity to voice demands by the people.  
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The gradual improvement in the governance framework can be seen from gradual improve-
ments in indicators for civil liberties and political freedom as well in the governance indicators 
during the past two elected presidencies of Mr. Mwinyi 1985-95 and Mr. Mkapa 1995-05 (see 
Annex F). The recent dramatic improvements shown by the World Bank in terms of control of 
corruption seems overoptimistic, especially if compared with the stagnation in the corruption 
perception index (as shown by Transparency International). Also our interview partners raised 
the concern of corruption, especially so at the local governance levels.  
There are big expectations from within the government but also the civil society that improve-
ments in the governance framework will continue to be strengthened with the newly elected 
presidency of Mr. Kikwete. 
 
2.2 Historical Perspective on Local Governance and Decentrali-
sation 
a) Decentralisation eras and civil society 
Decentralisation efforts have a long history in Tanzania and date back to colonial times. At in-
dependence in 1961, Mainland Tanzania had a relatively decentralised structure of local gov-
ernance. Then, the country moved towards a centralised system under President Julius Nyerere 
and saw a series of decentralisation eras in the last two decades (Boex / Martinez-Vazqez 
2006). The following table summarises these main policy changes in local governance and puts 
it in relation with the emergence of a civil society. 
 
Time line of policy changes in local governance and civil society 
Date Local Government Civil Society 
1950s  Liberal attitude towards associations: they 
could operate legally even without registra-
tion. As a result of social unrest the colonial 
Government saw them increasingly as an 
irritant before independence 
1960s 1961: Independence 
Abolishment of the native authorities (estab-
lished in 1926) and introduction of councils 
(17) with elected and appointed members 
above district level 
1967: Arusha Declaration (ujamaa or “pull-
ing together”) called for egalitarianism, so-
cialism and self-reliance. It involved decen-
tralisation the creation of cooperative farm 
villages and the regions becoming primary 
drivers of rural development planning 
Strong cooperative movement, which was 
weakened during the 1960s as a result of 
central government interferences 
1962: Amendment to the societies ordi-
nance gave the Government the power to 
dissolve any company or association in 
case of unlawful trade 
1967: The Arusha Declaration led to the 
absorption of CSOs into the single party 
structure introduced in 1965 
1970s 1972: Abolition of local governments be-
cause of poor performance: abolishment of 
local taxes, low maintenance capacity etc. -
> expansion of central power to village level 
1978: Decision to reinstate urban councils 
in order to change decline in standard of 
living 
Civil society was confined to party struc-
tures (youth, trade unions, etc.). Advocacy 
oriented CSOs were strongly discouraged 
1980s 1980: CCM requests the re-introduction of 
local government 
1984: Re-introduction of local government 
(district, municipal and cities authorities) 
Increasingly new organisations not affiliated 
to the party were tolerated  
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1990s 1990: Economic liberalisation and public 
sector reforms introduced accompanying 
structural adjustment programmes 
1992: Re-introduction of multi-party democ-
racy 
1996: Publication of the Local Government 
Reform Agenda 
1998: Policy Paper on Local Government 
Reform stipulating the D-by-D approach 
1993: A study reveals that 61% of secon-
dary schools, 87% of nursery schools and 
43% of hospitals were run by mostly faith 
based CSOs (CMI 2000) 
1996: National Steering Committee for 
NGO Policy Formulation established (with 
participation of CSOs) 
1998: Drafting of an NGO Act 
2000s 2001: Phase 1 of the LGR Programme 
(Common Basket Fund established by GoT 
with 8 bi- and 2 multilateral donors) 
2002: Phase 2: LGRP Medium term plan 
2002-2005 
2005: Phase 3: Medium Term Plan and 
budget 2005-2008 with Local Government 
Capital Development Fund  
2002: Despite widespread opposition from 
stakeholders the NGO Act was passed, but 
dialogue to improve the Act continued 
2005: The amendment to the NGO Act was 
passed 
2006: CSOs’ role in decentralisation conso-
lidated (manual on expenditure tracking, 
manual for CSOs on how to engage in de-
centralisation announced) 
 
Decentralisation efforts in Tanzania date back to the 1960s. The decentralisation efforts during 
the 1970s are somewhat inconclusive. On one side the central government promoted the uja-
maa village concept without considering feasibility and costs. It included forced resettlements of 
several million people (though at the late stage). On the other side it abolished local govern-
ments in 1972 expanding central control further with generous support by the donors. By the 
early 1980s, a team of party officials controlled the state and the economy almost entirely (Hey-
den 2005). Thus, under the rhetoric of decentralisation the local government systems got in-
creasingly centralised during that era. 
In the early 1980s the economic crisis deepened and shortages of basic commodities frustrated 
many people. The effects of the self-reliance strategy became obvious to millions of people and 
“the perforation of the state machinery by personal and informal initiatives had begun in ear-
nest” (Heyden 2005). In 1982 the local governments and district authorities were reinstated after 
realizing that the top down (de)centralization process had failed. These decentralisation efforts 
were coined by heavy-handed officials managing decision-making at region and district level but 
local authorities were under-resourced and staff with local governance experience was lacking. 
The last years of the 1980s saw an era of gradual but progressive liberalisation of the economy 
and the political sphere with slight improvement of rights and freedom. The introduction of the 
multi-party system - as a conditionality by donors – in 1992 has increased the political competi-
tiveness, but the CCM party remained the ruling party till now and is uncontested given the 
marginalised and fragmented opposition. 
Decentralisation received a major push in 1996 when the Government of Tanzania published a 
local government reform agenda. The subsequent policy paper in 1998 defined far reaching 
decentralisation aims by promoting the famous D-by-D principle: decentralisation by devolution. 
This approach aims at the devolution of real power and authority to elected sub-national gov-
ernments and not only at a deconcentration of central agencies. This far reaching reform wants 
to fundamentally change the role of the central and local authorities: the central ministries are 
expected to switch from direct implementation to a role of support and monitoring of local au-
thorities under the slogan “hands off, eyes on”.  
The formal decentralisation reform started when the Government of Tanzania and several do-
nors committed their support in form of basket funding for the Local Government Reform Pro-
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gramme (LGRP), which officially began in January 2000.2 The programme is now in its third 
phase (2005-2008) and was evaluated several times. The main aims of this programme are: 
 Devolution of power to locally elected councils and committees (political decentrali-
sation) 
 Collection of taxes and budgeting based on local priorities (financial decentralisation) 
 De-linking local authority staff from the respective line ministries making them account-
able to the local government (administrative decentralisation) 
 Changing the role of line ministries from control to that of policy making, regulating, sup-
port and monitoring to ensure quality of services and national standards. 
 
b) Decentralisation in the Mkukuta Strategy 
This ambitious change agenda was supposed to be closely coordinated with the other three 
main reform agendas that were (and still are) implemented within the Mkukuta strategy, which is 
the National Strategy for Growth and the Reduction of Poverty: the Public Service Reform (in-
creased effectiveness of the state), Public Financial Management Reform (more efficient and 
effective resource mobilisation and management, i.e. budgeting, etc.) and the Legal Reform. 
Naturally, these are complex change processes where various stakeholders follow their specific 
and often self-interests and potential losers resist change. The coordination efforts and cross-
effects of these reforms have proven to be more difficult, and progress is more slowly than an-
ticipated. Civil society has become a partner with its own voice that has been increasingly con-
sulted for the design and implementation of these policies. 
The importance of decentralisation and good governance as principles of policy reforms has 
been duly reflected within the Mkukuta strategy (2005). The following table illustrates their im-
portance: 
 
Mkukuta Strategy (2005/6 – 2009/10) 
Principles Clusters 
 National ownership 
 Political commitment to democratisation and 
human rights 
 Maintenance of macro-economic and struc-
tural reforms 
 Building on sector strategies and cross-
sectoral collaboration 
 Building local partnerships for citizens to en-
gage in policy dialogue 
 Harmonisation of aid 
 Equity and sharing of benefits 
 Sustainable development 
 Strengthening of macro-micro links and de-
centralisation 
 Mainstreaming cross cutting issues 
Cluster I 
Growth and reduction of poverty: sustained and 
equitable broad based growth of at least 6-8 % by 
scaling up investment in the agriculture and off-
farm sectors and in infrastructure. 
Cluster II 
Quality of life and social well being: reduction of 
vulnerabilities and ensuring equitable access to 
quality services in order to improve quality of life 
and well-being with a focus on the poorest. 
Cluster III 
Governance and accountability: this aims at four 
outcomes a) good governance, b) rule of law, c) 
sustaining peace and political stability, and d) war 
against corruption 
 
                                                
2  In 2006 the following bilateral donors are supporting the LGRP: Denmark, Finland, Ireland, (has the lead 
from donor side), Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. The following multilaterals finance 
the programme: EU, UNDP/UNCDF and the World Bank. 
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2.3 The Role of Civil Society Organisations 
Besides the government, the private sector and civil society play crucial roles in defining and 
observing the emergence of rules and regulations. The lead agency for the decentralisation 
reform is the Prime Minister’s Office for Regional Administration and Local Governance (PMO-
RALG), under which the LGRP is implemented. It is worthwhile to first look back to see how civil 
society and the collaboration between the government and the CSOs emerged. 
For much of the late colonial era a rather liberal attitude towards associations prevailed. How-
ever, the freedom of expression was restricted as a result of political tensions during the imme-
diate pre-independence time. After independence in 1964, the earlier strong cooperatives 
movement (organised around export commodities like coffee, tea etc.) was an important pillar of 
civil society. After independence, however, the leadership of the cooperatives was altered to 
serve party politics. As a result, the cooperative movement lost much of its power and credibil-
ity. The revival of the cooperative movement in the form of producer associations and the recent 
scheme to expand credit and saving groups (SACCOs) has still to overcome the resistance to-
wards collective action through awareness raising about the importance and utility of intermedi-
ary structures in order to pool interest and resources of producers and user groups. 
Formal civil society organisations were strictly discouraged between the late 1960s until the mid 
1980s unless they were closely affiliated to the CCM party structures. CSOs included trade un-
ions (e.g. teachers), youth organisations, women organisations, which were representing party 
interests and not genuine interests of its members. With the dawn of political and economic lib-
eralisation many of the existing CSOs did cut their relations with the party and became more 
independent. Also new civil society organisations providing basic services or advocating policy 
issues were founded.  
By the mid 1980s, around 200 NGOs were officially registered and many of them were actually 
active. In 1993, mainly faith-based NGOs were responsible for a substantial proportion of ser-
vice delivery. For example, 61 % of secondary schools and 43 % of hospitals were operated by 
CSOs (CMI 2000). Four years later, the number of NGOs had increased to 2000 already, 
though many remained silent organisations to be activated in the case of funding opportunities. 
In the same year the process of formulating an NGO policy started which resulted in strong de-
bates about the detailed provisions and elimination of inconsistencies. The bill could not be 
passed for several years because of the opposition from the NGO side. A major issue of con-
tention was that the NGO act 2002, as well as its amendments released in 2005, stipulates that 
NGOs as per definition shall be “non-partisan”. This basically means that “NGOs are organisa-
tions that do not seek political power or campaign for any political party” (Iheme 2005). Also the 
regulation that they have to fully account to the government for the origin and use of their fund-
ing was disputed and seen as incursion by some NGO representatives.  
This provision of the NGO law makes it possible to ban politically active NGOs. Most advocacy 
work related to poverty reduction and rights of citizens is political by its nature. Thus there is a 
feeling that the government likes service delivery NGOs that are supportive in achieving the 
development objectives (which are the party objectives at the same time), whereas NGOs that 
are criticizing the government can face serious difficulties. The recent case of Haki Elimu shows 
that the government indeed puts some pressure on the organisation but eventually avoided to 
ban it as a result of lobbying, especially by the media and intellectuals (see Box below). 
Today there are an estimated 4’000 NGOs, both international as well as national, either deliver-
ing services in education, health (especially HIV/AIDS) and credit and savings sectors or advo-
cating aspects of rights to services. Additionally, there are around 1’400 credit and saving 
groups (SACCOs). There is no data available, but many registered NGOs are considered “brief-
case NGOs”. They are dormant unless they are able to get access to donor funding. Dhuru 
(2005) concludes that many local CSOs have only a limited membership base, are seldom rep-
resentative, and that they have to adjust their activities in order to fulfil pre-determined goals of 
donors. Donors to local CSOs are not only international NGOs but also bilateral agencies. They 
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provide more substantial means to local CSOs in an attempt to balance their recent move to 
deliver more aid in form of General Budget Support.3 Several times it was mentioned that do-
nors prop up local CSOs so that they can fulfil the function of overseeing government spend-
ing.4
REPOA /OPM /CMI (2005, component 1) have made a classification of main CSOs and local 
groups that are active at national level and at local level. The study points to the fact that only 
little is known regarding the normative influence these organisations have and how informal 
organisations are funded and whether there is overlapping with formal CSOs. 
Despite the various weaknesses of NGOs and informal community organisations (see also sec-
tion 3.1 on participation) NGOs and umbrella organisations (e.g. TANGO) increasingly play a 
vital role in demanding access to information, providing services and advocating rights. Through 
this process they are becoming powerful normative actors demanding to improve standards and 
to adhere to principles of good governance in various areas. However, we also heard the opin-
ion that the government more easily accepts those NGOs that engage only in service delivery 
and views with some suspicion NGOs exercising a watchdog function regarding the monitoring 
of access to services and the human rights situation. The much-publicised case of Haki Elimu is 
a vivid illustration of this point (see following box). 
In 2005 Haki Elimu released a report that summarized the findings of several government or gov-
ernment commissioned reports about the performance of the Primary Education Development Plan. 
This report provoked a strong reaction from the Government leading nearly to the ban of the NGO 
since it was accused of having distorted the truth (subsequently the NGO was not provided with 
government data any more). The report reviews the progress in the education sector and points to 
the many deficiencies such as big regional imbalances, poor condition of many infrastructures, im-
balances in teachers’ deployment and leakage of funds at local level. 
The organisation with its 23 staff was threatened with a ban by the Government unless it apologised 
for the wrongdoing. However, thanks to intensive lobby work by journalists, intellectuals and the 
excellent reputation of its performance, Haki Elimu could continue to work. With the change of Minis-
ters at the end of 2005, the working relations have further improved but there is a general sense 
among CSO representatives that the Government does not appreciate NGOs that take their watch-
dog role too seriously. 
Haki Elimu (right to education) is a NGO founded in 2001 aiming at the promotion of public participa-
tion in education governance by strengthening school committees, teacher & student associations, 
facilitating planning at local level, advocating democratic principles in school management among 
other activities. For the advocacy work a variety of instruments are used: campaigns, and the use of 
radio and TV spots have proven to be very effective.  
Among the broad range of CSOs in Tanzania the influence in terms of setting the political 
agenda differs. It is most prominent in the case of national urban NGOs and there are several 
landmark decisions by the parliament in which NGOs did a lot of lobbying (Land act 1999, NGO 
Act 2002). The perceived influence is highest among business associations and media at the 
national level, and local authorities such as clan committees and religious organisations at the 
local level (REPOA / OPM / CMI 2005, component 1). NGO networks and international and na-
tional NGOs are perceived to have low to moderate influence in affecting society’s prevailing 
ideas and distribution of resources. 
Civil society in Tanzania is perceived as being fragmented and rather weak, by NGO represen-
tatives as well as by government representatives and by the parliamentarians. The present civil 
society is characterised by the following strengths and weaknesses: 
                                                
3  Presently Tanzania receives US $ 1'700 million of ODA annually, of which almost half is in form of General 
Budget Support and the rest Sector wide approaches or traditional project assistance. Total ODA represents 
approximately 16 % of GNI and covers almost 40 % of the state budget. 
4  Similarly, the broadcast media and press has expanded and diversified significantly with many private radio, 
TV and news products emerging since 1990.  
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Strengths Weaknesses 
 Most NGOs are pro-poor oriented and pro-
vide vital services, mainly in the health and 
education sectors 
 There is a more conducive environment now, 
also as a result of bottom up planning and of 
civil society’s lobbying 
 There are about 10 urban based NGOs, or 
networks, which can influence the policy for-
mulation process 
 The best way to convert poverty research into 
policy formulation is through civil society or-
ganisations 
 Capability to set standards and advocating 
rights has improved through coordination in 
“stakeholder forum”, and campaigning 
 Often dedicated and motivated young staff 
 Heavy dependency from donor funding and 
therefore many are inclined to align activities 
to donor priorities 
 Secure funding has priority over lobbying ad-
vocacy work. There could even be a tendency 
of self-censorship. 
 Lack of commercial / entrepreneurial thinking 
(e.g. in credit and saving groups) since profit 
making has been perceived as a “sinful” activ-
ity for a long period 
 Poor market linkages. “Sometimes products 
are there but no buyers” because of poor 
transport, lack of information, etc.  
 The NGOs are fragmented. There are only 2 
umbrella organisations (TANGO and TACO-
SUDE) 
 Most CSOs have a small membership base 
and often cannot claim to be representative 
for their constituency 
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3.  Decentralisation and CSOs: Progress and Challenges 
3.1 Political Sphere 
a) Political Commitment 
The Tanzanian decentralisation process is based on the principle of “decentralisation by devolu-
tion”, meaning that power is being “devolved” from central to decentralised levels of the political 
system and public administration. Devolving power implies entrusting – within national legisla-
tion - real control over finance and staff to elected Local Government Authorities (LGA). This 
policy is clearly set out in the 1998 “Policy Paper on Local Government Reform”, which remains 
the key political document for decentralisation till today. 
Among the key findings of the 2004 Joint Government-Donor Review on the Local Government 
Reform Programme is the conclusion that the overall Government policy on D-by-D has met 
with very limited success so far (URT 2004). It concluded that “Tanzania is not yet on a clear 
decentralisation path”. Most of our interview partners agree by and large with these conclusions. 
Following the arguments of the 2004 Review there seems to be the following reasons behind 
these limited results: 
 There is limited internalisation of the basic concepts of D-by-D by central ministries, 
which continue to seek direct control over LGA. “Central ministries are not yet clear that 
their role within a devolved system of governance is to establish a precise legal frame-
work for LGAs and appropriate systems for inspection, supervision and support” (URT 
2004). More outspoken critics find that (some) ministries are actively opposed to D-by-D 
rather than simply lacking role-clarity 
 Decentralisation so far has mainly resulted in deconcentration, bringing the bureaucracy 
closer to the people. “Some bureaucrats felt like semi-gods at the local level”. Now it 
seems to be difficult to reduce their influence 
 There seems to be limited acceptance of the fact that D-by-D means transferring power 
to elected sub-national governments. Establishing local governments elected democ-
ratically would imply a huge step away from a political culture which until very recently 
(some would say: still now) has been determined by a one-party centralised state. Im-
plementing such a change would require a political will and decision-making structure at 
the highest level of government that was not apparent under the hitherto existing 
scheme of the LGRP 
 Devolving power to LGA implies a new role of sector ministries that appears to be nei-
ther understood nor accepted. Instead of directly implementing national policies in a de-
centralised mode of operation, sector ministries are supposed to assume a role of over-
all policy-determination, resource allocation, regulation, support and monitoring. Efforts 
and success to win understanding and support for this re-defined role of sector minis-
tries have been limited to date. 
Our interview partners and our personal observations confirmed the continuing strong presence 
of central government at local level. There are several mechanisms, which continue to ensure 
central government influence and thus limit local autonomy: 
 Key staff at local level continues to be appointed by the central government (District 
Commissioners, District Executive Director). The elected district councillors and lower 
level tiers of LGA (ward, village) have no authority to hold executive district staff to ac-
count or to dismiss them 
 In most districts, an overwhelming majority of elected district councillors are members of 
the ruling CCM party and have (probably) little inclination to question or openly criticise 
decisions taken by district commissioners appointed by the central (CCM) government 
 So far most of the funds available at local level emanate from sector ministries budget 
(e.g. education, health) and are tied to very specific regulations of these ministries 
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 The change of mindset from the implementation to the supervision function of Local 
Government Authorities (LGA) takes time and many changes have not really developed 
deeper roots (e.g. mechanistic or formal application of decentralisation procedures). 
People still sit down and wait for action (to be taken by others) and the mentality to have 
a right to free services is still widespread. More advocacy work is required, by CSOs 
and the government. Communication of all the policy changes and related procedures 
throughout the various administrative levels is a real challenge: paperwork and work-
shops are not enough. 
In contrast to the reservations of central government towards genuine decentralisation we found 
evidence of strong commitment with the LGRP at local level. Officials at regional, district and 
village level were well informed about the reform process and in some cases expressed their 
firm belief in the goals and underlying philosophy of decentralisation by D-by-D. They pointed 
out the positive aspects and results achieved so far such as increased involvement of village 
population in planning, strengthened partnership between LGA and local civil society organisa-
tions (NGOs), and increased transparency with regards to locally available budgets and deci-
sion-making. Our visit to the Kongwa District (see box below) provided a vivid example of what 
can be achieved in terms of local development and coordination between local stakeholders if 
the district executive staff is committed to the principles of decentralisation.  
Nevertheless our interview partners also emphasised the huge challenges that still lie ahead 
mentioning among others the limited capacities of all stakeholders (LGA staff, local CSOs, vil-
lage groups, etc.), the limited financial and human resources and the limited access to technol-
ogy and communication facilities.  
Civil society organisations at national and local level generally have actively supported decen-
tralisation in Tanzania and are involved in numerous ways. However, the Tanzanian Govern-
ment with its authoritarian tradition seems still uneasy in its relationship with CSOs, especially 
those that it perceives as being overly critical. Government and civil society have yet to agree 
on a mutually acceptable frame of constructive criticism.  
At national level CSOs and their federations have been participating in the formulation of the 
decentralisation policy and are included in the donor-government steering group of the LGRP 
(Cluster Three of Government-DPG Consultation Mechanisms). Some NGOs are implementing 
initiatives that are crucial for the long-term success of decentralisation. Two examples are RE-
POA, a research and training organisation, and TANGO, the Tanzania Association of NGOs. 
REPOA5 is implementing – among other projects – the web-based “Tanzanian Government 
Notice Board”, a public expenditure tracking system where detailed budgetary information on 
each district is made available to the public. The same NGO has also been implementing ca-
pacity building programmes aimed at strengthening local CSOs for service delivery and policy 
engagement. The purpose of this initiative is to strengthen local participation and to promote the 
bottom-up planning processes based on the O&OD approach (see below). REPOA is also pub-
lishing the results of applied research on various aspects of development and governance at 
local level.  
TANGO, a national NGO umbrella organisation, is implementing various capacity building and 
training schemes including the publication of manuals aimed at increasing the capacity of local 
NGOs to form local or regional networks for policy engagement (advocacy). TANGO sees its 
role in empowering local and regional organisations in order to strengthen local capacities for 
establishing a policy dialogue between LGA and local CSOs or civil society networks at district 
level. TANGO encourages CSO representatives to get elected into district councils and provides 
advice and support. According to TANGO it is this dialogue at district level, which gives local 
and regional CSOs a voice in local political affairs and development planning. However, the 
presence of them at village and district level seems to be generally rather weak with the notice-
able exception of local programmes of churches and some international NGOs.  
                                                
5 REPOA (Research on Poverty Alleviation) is an independent non-profit research organisation 
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Another important CSO voice is the Policy Forum, an umbrella organisation of the most impor-
tant NGOs in Tanzania addressing jointly development policy issues. The political commitment 
of local level (village, ward, district) or regional level (region) LGAs and CSOs is a key element 
for the long-term success of decentralisation by devolution. There are at least three domains 
where civil society involvement at local level is crucial for effective decentralisation to succeed: 
Participation: Participatory planning approaches such as O&OD (opportunities and obstacles 
for development) presuppose the existence of active and representative community-based 
groups and organisations, which assure that the needs and interests of all societal groups are 
taken into consideration. 
Legitimacy:  Elected districts councils and (in the future) elected district executive officials such 
as district commissioners can only claim democratic legitimacy when a variety of civic groups 
and organisations participate in the electoral process at local level, in other words when the 
shortcoming of a still de-facto one-party state is replaced by a true multi-party system.  
Accountability and Transparency: Governments whether national or local ones, tend to ne-
glect accountability and transparency if they are not constantly reminded and pressured by civil 
society. There is a need of strong CSOs at local level that have the capacity to understand and 
monitor the performance of LGA and the expenditure of public funds and thus constantly remind 
local authorities of their duty to account for their actions to the public.  
 
b) Policy Coherence 
Lack of coherence and coordination with regard to the legal framework and legal harmonisation 
of the Local Government Reform is analysed in detail in the 2004 Review. This lack of coher-
ence can be considered, as an indicator for the lack of political will of the central government to 
effectively implement decentralisation by devolution. The report cites a number of instances 
where legislation was passed that actually contradicted or hindered decentralisation. According 
to the assessment team the most significant setback of decentralisation was the Public Service 
Act and Public Service Regulation of 2002 and 2003, which contradicted earlier regulations of 
the Ministry responsible of RALG (Regional Administration and Local Government) that con-
ceded local government authorities some autonomy regarding human resources management. 
Meanwhile the government is making efforts to take corrective measures. The report cites other 
cases where efforts to harmonise legal frameworks at the level of sectoral ministries either 
failed or were not pursued with sufficient rigor.  
As long as ministries see the LGRP as just another sector reform programme, it is doubtful 
whether significant progress can be made. Decentralisation by devolution implies a profound re-
structuring of the entire state apparatus with consequences regarding legal and political coher-
ence for all sector ministries. The report concludes that the success of the decentralisation 
process in future will depend on the capacity of PMO-RALG or some highest-level coordination 
authority to “impose D-by-D compliance on new legislation or on ministerial policy”.  
More than thirty years after having decided to move Tanzania’s capital to Dodoma, the Ministry 
for Decentralisation (PMO-RALG) remains the only government entity, which is fully installed in 
the political capital. Obviously, the geographical distance to Dar es Salaam does not facilitate 
coordination and cooperation with other government entities. This fact might well be interpreted 
as an indicator for the lack of political will to fully implement decentralisation by devolution. 
As evidenced by the Review of 2004, donors play a crucial role in keeping up the momentum of 
the decentralisation process and in keeping up the pressure to achieve a satisfactory level of 
policy coherence. Within the architecture set up between the bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors 
and the Tanzanian Government there is a specific structure of consultation and coordination for 
the Local Government Reform Programme. On the Tanzanian side there is the Local Govern-
ment Reform Programme Consultative Group where the relevant ministries, donors and repre-
sentatives of civil society organisations take part. On the donor side there is a specific working 
group formed by the donors engaged in local government reform. This group is chaired alterna-
tively by Ireland and the Netherlands. The activities of both entities are regulated by Terms of 
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Reference and based on annual work plans. This strong presence of powerful outside actors in 
the decentralisation process leaves open the crucial question of ownership.  
Problems of policy coherence also arise at local level as a result of the clash of two different 
planning cultures. On one hand there is the traditional top-down planning culture of the former 
centralised one-party state where party programme and Government policy are (almost) one 
and the same. In fact, a recent study has shown that there are no fundamental differences be-
tween the key national policy framework Mkukuta and the 2005 CCM electoral platform (CCM 
Election Manifesto). On the other hand, there is the new participatory bottom-up planning ap-
proach under the decentralisation scheme which is supposed to capture the felt needs of the 
people independently of political priorities of parties or Government at national level. The actual 
reality of this “clash of planning cultures” was illustrated by one District Commissioner who 
proudly showed us a report on the achievements of his district administration that was produced 
in his office. The cover of the report carried both the logo of the Government of Tanzania and 
the logo of the CCM. He explained that thanks to the fact that 29 out of 30 councillors in his dis-
trict were CCM party members, the whole planning at district level was made in strict accor-
dance with the CCM election platform and that with this report he could show to the people that 
his district administration was fulfilling the promises made by the party during the election cam-
paign.  
 
c) Participation  
Participation in planning processes at local level is one of the pillars of the Local Government 
Reform Programme. As pointed out in the study of REPOA on local participation (Cooksey / 
Kikula 2005), the commitment of the Government to participatory planning is backed politically 
and legally and can be found in a number of relevant documents regarding development in 
general and decentralisation in particular. In the “Tanzania Development Vision 2025” which 
was proclaimed in 2000, the aim of local participation is described in the following terms: “Delib-
erate efforts must be made to empower the people and catalyze their democratic and popular 
participation. The strategy should entail empowering local governments and communities and 
promoting broad-based grassroots in the mobilization of resources, knowledge and experience 
with a view to stimulating initiatives at al levels of society”. This quotation shows that participa-
tion in local planning processes is not only seen as a technical means to ensure that felt needs 
of the people are taken into account in locally managed development processes. Participation is 
also defined politically as a strategy of empowerment aimed at increasing democratic participa-
tion in political processes. 
A specific methodology was developed to ensure participatory planning within the LGRP: the 
“Opportunity and Obstacles for Development” approach (O&OD). This approach combines ele-
ments of the Participatory Rural Appraisal  methodology  and SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weak-
nesses, Opportunities, Threats). This planning method was adopted in 2001 by LGRP as a 
planning framework at local level for the whole country. It was first used in 2002 in pilot areas 
and subsequently adopted in many other districts. In 2004 PMO-RALG produced the O&OD 
Manual, which was used in widespread training processes for facilitators and officials at village, 
ward and district level.  
The methodology proposed by the manual foresees a bottom-up planning process beginning at 
village level and going up to ward and district. The core result of the process is the Village Plan 
which is then approved at ward and district level. Then, the various village plans are integrated 
into a district plan approved by the elected district council. The whole process is supervised by 
the authorities at regional level (Regional Administrative Secretary). 
The entire package of establishing the methodology for participatory planning, the training of 
facilitators and the implementation of the planning processes was widely supported by external 
donors. However the experience has shown that area-wide participatory planning processes at 
the grass-roots can be very costly. The 2004 Review of the Local Government Reform Pro-
gramme explicitly mentions the O&OD participatory planning approach as an example for a 
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costly planning method, citing a report according to which in one single district (Hai District)       
$ 100'000 were spent solely for facilitating participatory planning. 
REPOA is one of the NGOs involved in training facilitators for O&OD participatory planning. In 
order to verify the success of its training and assess the use of participatory approaches to local 
planning in rural areas, REPOA carried out a tracer study (Cooksey and Kikula, 2005) among 
the participants of its training courses. The study shows on one hand that participatory methods 
in planning at local level are indeed increasingly used. However top-down guidelines of central 
ministries concerning the use of sectoral budgets (education, health, roads) severely restrict the 
implementation of village plans based on local priorities derived from participatory planning. 
Another factor limiting the effectiveness of local planning is the large number of villages and 
wards that make it difficult for districts to integrate village plans. 
The study further identifies a number of other problems related to participatory planning: "LGAs 
are generally under-staffed and many staff are under-qualified; the transport they have is gen-
erally used by top officials for official trips, usually outside the district; LG staff lack incentives, 
many work only part-time; there is lack of data and existing data are generally unreliable; com-
puters and other work tools are lacking. LGAs are more responsive to the region and to central 
ministries, to donors and international NGOs, than to villages. Half a dozen overlapping national 
reform initiatives and programmes impinge on LGAs, stretching capacity and creating ad hoc 
priorities and confusion." (Cooksey / Kikula, 2005, p. 32) 
The assessment expressed in the following paragraph from the REPOA study aptly describes 
the fundamental contradiction concerning participatory planning, which coincides with opinions 
we heard from a number of our interview partners: "Politically, the discourse of participation and 
empowerment contained in PRA contrasts with the reality of the dominance of the political-
bureaucratic class over economic and civil society actors and organisations. It is true that the 
bureaucratic mindset is slow to change and strongly influenced by a recent past of state-led, 
comprehensive development planning. More significant are the vested interests of political-
bureaucratic class to retain central control of resources that devolution would put into the hands 
of others." (ibid.) 
The Local Government Reform Programme did not initiate the use of participatory approaches 
to planning at local level. Participatory planning methods were first introduced by projects spon-
sored or executed by international governmental or non-governmental agencies. Observations 
during our field visits confirmed that NGOs have a prominent role in spreading the use of par-
ticipatory approaches to project planning, implementation and monitoring. Many NGO projects 
at grassroots level have succeeded in establishing a "culture of participation" that is very effec-
tive for empowerment and for fostering ownership for local change processes. This is especially 
the case in programmes, which involve women. These experiences constitute an important ba-
sis and condition for the successful implementation of the O&OD methodology.  
One of our interview partners pointed at an important and potentially critical issue with regard to 
participation. The implementation of participatory planning processes without adequate capaci-
ties and without the corresponding mechanisms of participation in the decision-making on allo-
cating funds seems to have led to wide-spread frustration and disillusionment. Politically signifi-
cant participation is not only about asking people what they need. Participation also means that 
people have a say in the decision-making on priorities and are involved in the implementation of 
projects and programmes designed by themselves for their own benefit. 
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3.2 Administrative Factors 
a) Human Resources 
Administrative decentralisation was intended to be one of the fundamental characteristics of 
Tanzania's decentralisation policy. The principle stated in the 1998 policy paper on decentralisa-
tion was that local government staff would be accountable to locally elected councils. This im-
plied that councils would be responsible for recruiting, rewarding, promoting and firing their own 
personnel. Up to date this principle has not been fully implemented. 
A major set-back in administrative decentralisation was the enactment of the new Public Service 
Act of 2002 and 2003 Public Service Regulations which introduced deconcentrated personnel 
management within a unified public service. This is severely limiting the possibilities of Local 
Government Authorities to manage their own staff. Meanwhile, measures have been taken to 
correct this situation by amending the Public Service Act in a manner that takes account of the 
needs and objectives of administrative decentralisation. However there are still a number of 
limitations to human resource management at local level: 
 The institutional set-up of human resource management at local level is still basically 
centralised. Conditions of service are still designed by central government thus prevent-
ing LGAs to create locally adapted conditions and incentives 
 Councils are still exposed to centrally-sanctioned staff transfer  
 Some central ministries seem to be undermining administrative decentralisation by set-
ting up parallel procedures in order to continue centralised management of certain cate-
gories of staff such as teachers and others 
 LGAs have little power to decide over the size of staff at local level; councils continue to 
have limited power over recruiting and firing key staff 
 Limited financial resources prevent LGAs to offer financial incentives in order to attract 
and maintain qualified staff. 
As a consequence LGAs have difficulties in finding and retaining qualified personnel and there 
are a lot of vacancies, particularly in remote rural areas. There are expectations that the World 
Bank financed Local Government Capital Development Grants will widen LGA’s discretionary 
power over staff management by providing untied funds to the district councils linked to per-
formance indicators.  
As some of our interview partners pointed out, the slow pace in administrative decentralisation 
is understandable and justified because of the scope of changes that is involved in administra-
tive decentralisation. Changing the mindset of government officials who have been used to work 
in a formerly highly centralised public service is certainly a long-term task. On the other hand, 
the slow progress seems to be an indicator for the resistance and lack of political will of central 
government authorities to devolve power and resources to decentralised levels of government.  
 
b) Capacity Building  
Lack of capacity of elected councillors and staff was among the arguments most often heard 
from our interview partners to explain the slow progress and the deficiencies of decentralisation. 
Councillors often are elected for their party affiliation and not for their capacities and competen-
cies as local leaders. In general the educational level of councillors, particularly in rural areas, 
seems to be rather low. One leading official of the LJRP complained that in many cases elected 
councils are not aware of their duties and functions and are not always complying with their ob-
ligations. Another problem is posed by the fact that councillors are elected for a five-year term. 
That means that efforts for capacity building for councillors must be repeated every five years. 
Also other actors such as district administration staff and ward and village officials seem to be 
ill-prepared for the demanding tasks related to participatory, bottom-up and transparent plan-
ning and management of local affairs.   
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Nevertheless, considerable efforts have been made by governmental and non-governmental 
organisations to strengthen the capacities of the different groups of actors. The 2004 Review 
contains some impressive figures about the training activities designed and organised by the 
LGRP (although not necessarily implemented by it): 
 72’000 grassroot leaders have participated in courses on local government issues 
 All 3’500 councillors were trained on issues such as their role and responsibilities, reve-
nues, finances, legislation 
 More than 6’000 village and ward officials were trained 
 Hundreds of thousand of booklets on various local government issues were distributed.  
 
As awareness of the importance of capacity building for the successful implementation of de-
centralisation has increased efforts for training have been reinforced. An important step forward 
is the Capacity Building Grant put up by the World Bank as complementary measure to assure 
successful implementation of the Local Government Capital Development Grant scheme. It will 
provide means for systematic human resource development made available to qualified district 
administrations. 
One training institution engaged in capacity building for decentralisation was visited during our 
stay in Dodoma, the Institute for Rural Development Planning (IRDP). It offers various degree 
programmes focused on local and regional development issues. Additionally, a postgraduate 
diploma course and short courses provide training opportunities for local leaders and staff of 
LGAs. The IRDP is mandated by PMO-RALG to develop and implement training courses for 
Local Government Authorities on the following topics: leadership, project cycle management, 
information management, local government strategic planning. In view of the Local Government 
Capital Development Fund the institute is developing training courses on financial planning and 
investment. However the limited capacities of the IRDP seem to be inadequate for the huge 
task of area-wide training of councillors, staff and local leaders.  
All our interview partners and the written sources consulted coincide on the need for increased 
efforts in capacity building in order to overcome the enormous challenge posed by the far-
reaching change processes of decentralisation. Nevertheless, some progress can be observed. 
A high-level official of the LGRP pointed out that Local Government Authorities have learnt that 
they are no longer part of a centralised state apparatus but members of self-dependent local 
entities, and that they are responsible to the villagers for the democratic and transparent man-
agement of local affairs. Bottom-up planning processes are internalised by all actors at local 
level and have been established area-wide as regular procedure. Also the 2004 Review stated 
that progress had been made in strengthening the organisational and individual capabilities of 
LGAs in areas such as financial and human resource management. Furthermore, it stated that 
general awareness of reform had been enhanced across major cadres such as councillors, di-
rectors and senior management, village and ward officials and elected representatives (URT 
2004). 
 
c) Governance  
Decentralisation by devolution implies changes in two dimensions. On one hand, it aims at re-
defining the power relationship between central and local government by devolving power and 
responsibility from the central state to local government authorities. On the other, it also rede-
fines the relationship between government authorities (at local level) and the citizens. The local 
government reform is therefore a governance reform. This implies that principles of good gov-
ernance not only apply to central but also to local government. 
The “Medium Term Plan and Budget, July 2005-June 2008” of the Local Government Reform 
Programme defines good governance by the following elements: democratically elected lead-
ers, rule of law, equity, public participation, accountability, integrity and transparency. For this 
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period 2005 to 2008 the programme is focussing on the following priorities and has formulated 
these objectives: 
 Increased accountability of politicians and public servants to service users  
 Increased powers and responsibilities decentralised to lower level local government 
 Gender issues mainstreamed in local government 
 Increased civic awareness and involvement in local government processes. 
The evidence available to us indicates that progress towards these objectives seems to depend 
to a considerable extent on personal inclinations of individual District Commissioners. Whether 
or not to invite local CSOs to stakeholder meetings, or whether or not to make figures on budg-
ets and expenditure available to the citizens seems to be subject to personal decisions of local 
officials or politicians. However, democratic values such as accountability and public participa-
tion should not be favours granted by well-meaning politicians or officials, but rights to which 
citizens living under a democratic regime are entitled. Therefore the citizens through their or-
ganisations must demand these rights and exercise pressure if these are not granted.  
Interviews with representatives of NGOs confirmed that Tanzanian civil society organisations 
are well aware of these challenges. At national, regional and local level we found evidence of 
numerous initiatives aiming at strengthening the capacity of the people to exercise their rights 
as citizens. Some CSOs such as REPOA and others are directly engaged in training and capac-
ity building activities within the institutional context of decentralisation. Other CSO initiatives are 
focused on building regional and local capacities for participation and lobbying. In general the 
participatory approach of CSO projects and programmes such as those visited in the Kongwa 
District (LVIA) or in the Bukoba and the Muleba Districts (Swissaid and FOGOTA), which aim at 
empowering villagers by building up and supporting their self-help organisations, are laying an 
important groundwork for participatory and transparent local government. 
The analysis of these issues within the broader context of policy reform and international devel-
opment cooperation raises some interesting points. According to the agreements achieved be-
tween donors and partner countries in 2005 known as the "Paris Declaration“, development aid 
has to be delivered based on the principles of harmonisation and alignment. This implies the 
following approaches: 
 Donors should align their aid programmes with the overarching national development 
policy, in the case of Tanzania the national poverty reduction and growth strategy, the 
Mkukuta 
 Donors should deliver up to 66% of their aid budgets in the form of programme-based 
aid (i.e. general budget support or sector-wide approaches) 
 Donors should harmonise among themselves their aid delivery modalities in order to re-
duce transaction costs. 
This harmonised approach tends to focus development cooperation on one actor, the central 
government. There is general agreement (which includes the authors of this study) that the new 
agenda launched by the “Paris Declaration” represents a desirable trend in international coop-
eration aiming at increased aid effectiveness. However, there is an inherent risk of marginalising 
other important actors of political and social change that hitherto where also partners of interna-
tional donors, namely the private sector and civil society. In our view donors should develop 
mechanisms to enhance their support for civil society organisations at all levels in order to 
strengthen democracy and foster governance at all levels, independently of the preferences of 
the partner country's government. 
Decentralisation by devolution can only succeed if simultaneously local government authorities 
and civil society organisations at local and regional level are strengthened in their capacity to 
act as partners in planning and implementation and to demand transparency and accountability.  
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3.3  Fiscal factors  
a) LGA Revenues and Expenditures 
A study by Fjeldstad (2001) illustrated the complicated tax system at the local level, differing in 
essence from district to district and resulting in more than 100 tax systems at the local level in 
Tanzania. This resulted in many inconsistencies between local efforts and central policies and 
the poor administrative capacity to manage local taxes resulted in a rather erratic tax collection. 
Combined with the deteriorating quality public of services as a result of budgetary constraints in 
the late 1990s and increasing corruption most taxpayers had the perception of taxes being “ex-
ploitative”. This increased tax resistance and sometimes local tax collectors were (selectively) 
coercive in tax collection. Many small taxes were more costly to collect than the revenues and 
they represented only 6 % of total tax revenues in Tanzania at that time. However, local taxes 
were a main source of revenues of rural districts because of small transfer payments from the 
central government at that time.  
In 2003, an “over-the-night” decision by the central government, largely by-passing also the 
parliament, abolished several local taxes at once6. Thus, the local authorities lost various 
sources of income and the proportion of local taxes dropped significantly (see box on Kongwa). 
The share of own revenues of LGAs dropped from 20 % to an estimated 10 % of local tax in-
come (URT 2004). Most of the revenues are now from shared taxes7 or stem from transfer 
payments from the central government that are conditional (e.g. for salaries of teachers and 
health staff). As a consequence, the financial dependency of LGAs from the centre greatly in-
creased (especially of urban areas and districts). The whole process in this policy adjustment 
created unnecessary problems (drop in revenues) and a broad confusion on tax responsibilities. 
This pinpoints to the problems which a rapid shift in policies can create if the consequences are 
not ex-ante assessed and communicated properly. 
On the other hand, the abolition of some of the local taxes has rationalised these local taxes 
and clearly reduced administrative work at local level. The interview partners argued that own-
ership by local people can be better fostered through beneficiary contributions in form of labour 
and material or the collection of direct user fees for example for drinking water than taxing them. 
This is certainly a valid point for rural districts with a high incidence of poverty, but for economi-
cally more advanced municipal authorities a sound local tax base could be important for careful 
allocation of public funds and promoting accountability by tax payers. Many of these decisions 
and fixing tax rates is a matter of sectoral policies. Overall, the decision making on most of the 
local taxes seems still highly centralised till now and fiscal autonomy of LGA has not really in-
creased.  
The main financial resources at district level besides the local taxes derive from a) conditional 
recurrent sector grants (usually sector specific allocations based on allocation formula), b) un-
conditional grants (LGCDG), and c) project related investments and subsidies. The conditional 
transfers from the central government, which are based on a formula, increased substantially 
during the past years (see also box on Kongwa) and they more than compensated for the re-
duction or abolition of local taxes. These transfers are disbursed as sectoral grants, personal 
emoluments and other charges. Education has by far the biggest resource allocation (ca. 70 % 
in most districts) followed by health (17 %). Other sectors like water, roads and agriculture get 
less than 15 %.  
A substantial change related to the fiscal decentralisation was the increased transparency as a 
result of introducing village accounts (e.g. under the Primary Education Development Plan). 
Funds for primary school constructions are released directly to the village level and the elected 
council has the full responsibility for the management of the funds used for school expansion 
programmes. 
                                                
6 E.g. the livestock taxes, development levy or the business licence among others. 
7  30 % of fuel levy, 20 % of land rent (for lease of state land), and hunting fees are transferred back to LGAs. 
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Boex / Martinez-Vazquez in their recent study (2006) concluded that Tanzania’s progress in 
fiscal decentralisation “is placing the country at the forefront of local government finance reform 
in Sub-Sahara Africa.” This success was attributed to a) the introduction of a formula based 
transfer of central revenues to LGAs considering local level demands, and b) the right sequenc-
ing of the reforms (by design and partly by luck), c) systematically considering lessons learnt 
based on experiences, and d) adjusting the regulatory frame as a result of a broad-based politi-
cal will. Without such a will Boex / Martinez-Velazques argue the whole fragile fiscal reform 
would have failed as it did in many other African countries. 
 
b) The Local Government Capital Development Grants Scheme 
A new Local Government Capital Development Grants scheme was introduced in 2005. Thus 
related experiences are rather new and the scheme is being scaled up at present. This scheme, 
which is financed by the World Bank8 and some bilateral donors, will substantially increase the 
discretionary funds available at district level. This increases the local autonomy and responsibil-
ity substantially. The LGCDG scheme provides the districts with additional resources in the 
magnitude of US $ 0.5 million per year in average in order to invest in priority projects selected 
at the local level (and approved by the higher levels) and to build local capacity through train-
ings on new procedures (e.g. such projects need to undergo an environmental impact assess-
ment). This will put the priority to local level negotiations in order to decide whether a commu-
nity wants to invest in more clinics versus more roads, or more class rooms versus more desks. 
This provides the LGA with ample responsibility and opportunity to engage in learning by doing.  
The inherent risk of low capacity at local level to manage these processes and funds is met by a 
capacity building programme for councillors, LGA representatives and members of CSOs. In 
order to avoid that investment will be allocated to non-poverty related areas there is a clause 
that at least 80% of investments must go into priority areas outlined in the Mkukuta strategy. 
Another concern is that local technical and administrative capacities to implement this scheme 
are not yet in place in all LGAs. Another challenge is the big variation in capacity and perform-
ance of local authorities. 
In order to obtain such funds, the districts have to qualify with a proven record of good govern-
ance behaviour mainly in the field of financial management (e.g. procurement, financial report-
ing, audit statements, etc.). Around 70 of the 120 LGAs are presently eligible and the scheme 
has increased the pressure on local authorities that do not yet qualify for participation. Local 
people and politicians increasingly opinion their voice to improve the performance of the district 
in order that it also qualifies for these additional resources. Some local government councils 
even started to demand the replacement of ministerial staff that was responsible for the low 
performance, which however was not much appreciated by the central ministries. There are 
also concerns that the capacity for independent audit of the LGA accounts is low (there are 
many vacancies in the LGRP) and that the assessment could be too lenient because of political 
considerations or pressure. 
The past fiscal reforms and these LGCDG resources result in substantially increased budgets at 
the district level (see Annex G). The resources available at the local level are expected to in-
crease substantially and in the case of the Kongwa District will show a 6 fold increase of per 
capita budgets at local level between 1999 and 2007. This good progress will, however, in-
crease expenditures only to approximately US $ 25 per capita and year (for the Kongwa Dis-
trict). This poses two challenges: firstly, to invest these additional resources in the districts re-
quires a more active role for the CSOs and the private sector in project planning and implemen-
tation, and secondly the LGCDG resources of the World Bank are loans that will have to be paid 
back in future by Tanzania. Although the Bank has made a cost-benefit assessment, only im-
proved performance of the LGA, better cooperation with CSOs and the private sector, and in-
                                                
8  The World Bank committed US $ 30 million for a first phase in 2004, and an additional US $ 92 million in 
2006. 
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creased accountability at local level will ensure that these additional resources are spent in ef-
fective investments at local level benefiting the poor. 
 
c) Accountability and Transparency 
The transparency in budgeting and financial information at the village and district level has im-
proved as a result of the Local Governance and Public Finance Reforms. The Finance Minister 
has reiterated the role of civil society in her recent budget speech when she said “... likewise the 
general public is reminded of its responsibility of regularly scrutinizing the council’s expenditures 
by tracking disbursements from the Treasury” (URT 2006). Many people and organisations are 
aware that they have the right to see the figures of public finance and such figures have to be 
shown on boards. This political and legal right to information is ensured in the constitution as 
well as in a variety of policy documents that have further specified this right.9 Yet, the following 
problems persist in disseminating the information on budgets and expenditures: 
 The analysis and interpretation of budget figures needs analytical skills that are not 
easily available, both among many elected councillors, local NGOs as well as ordi-
nary citizens 
 The access to relevant financial data is constrained because a) budgets can change 
substantially during the year (e.g. because a donor makes a substantial commitment 
on short notice), b) and that b) districts receive funds from a broad range of sources 
(bilateral donors, international NGOs etc) which are not all channelled through LGAs 
 Analysis is further complicated because revised budgets and expenditures often do 
not match (e.g. underspending), or budgets and expenditures are not transparently 
linked or because no breakdown for individual items is available. Financial formats 
can be complicated and therefore analysis can be time-consuming 
 Getting the disaggregated information on how funds are channelled from LGA to ward 
and village level can be a big challenge and involve a lot of work, especially when the 
funds are from various sources. 
The level of transparency achieved at field level depends not only on technical measures such 
as the Finance Information Management System, or signboards and Internet homepages but 
depend on the willingness and communication capabilities of the District Commissioner, the 
District Executive Director and related staff to provide an information sharing platform. In 
Kongwa such a platform existed through the regular “stakeholder meetings”. Secondly, informa-
tion about budgets has become more transparent through notice boards in the districts and the 
web-based Tanzania Governance Noticeboard, maintained and updated by REPOA. Recently, 
the GoT has also started to provide detailed information on budgets and expenditures at the 
district level (http://www.logintanzania.net/about.htm). Despite these efforts, many interview part-
ners believe that the outreach of such information in rural areas is very limited. For many people 
radios remain the single most important information tool and as long as Internet information is 
not translated into Kisuaheli, such efforts are mainly for reassuring the critical donors. Also the 
recent joint expenditure review (PEFAR 2007) by donor and national representatives has con-
cluded that data collection and reconciliation at the local level is a challenge.  
Accountability is inextricably linked with the analysis of how and where the money is flowing. 
Though the LGA accounts are audited regularly (by MOF auditors) there is some concern re-
garding the independence of these auditors and the strong position and influence the district 
accountants have. As a specific form of social audit,10 the Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys 
                                                
9  Mkukuta states that „equitable allocation of public resources with corruption effectively being addressed“. 
The LGRP explicitly mentions the role of CSOs: “the demand side of the information equation is where 
NGOs in particular have a comparative advantage” (PMO-RALG 2005). 
10  Social audits date back to the 1950s. It is a way of measuring, understanding, reporting and ultimately 
improving an organization’s social and ethical performance. A social audit helps to narrow gaps be-
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(PETS) were piloted in Tanzania and a network of CSOs has elaborated a training manual in 
order to scale it up (Hakikazi Catalyst et al. 2006). PETS refers to a system of presenting public 
financial information in a way that allows the main stakeholders such us councillors, government 
officials and CSOs to analyse where the money is coming from and where it is being spent. The 
draft training manual outlines 3 different methodological approaches: 
 Focus on efficiency and effectiveness: Compilation of budget/expenditure tables and 
analysis of the flow of funds to lower tiers at LGA level 
 Focus on marginalised groups (e.g. gender): Policy analysis on the basis of policies and 
possibly sex-disaggregated data 
 Focus on community: participatory development of community score cards to monitor 
budgets and poverty indicators. 
Although the access to information is legally guaranteed, the actual access to such data is cum-
bersome and requires a strong CSO network in the district and strategies to involve the media.  
Good governance and decentralisation is a main concern in the Mkukuta strategy and a priority 
for the government. Capacity building to absorb all the new guidelines and procedures has 
started rather late but is now being taken up by many stakeholders and training providers. The 
problem is that this capacity building (changing mindsets) takes more time than technocratic 
changes in procedures, guidelines etc. There is still a big need for the government to actively 
engage with the civil society and to fully exploit the complementary potential. 
On the other side there is substantial potential to improve financial and operational transparency 
on activities and results at the CSOs. For various reasons, some NGOs are quite comfortable 
with opaque levels of transparency. A successfully established CSO platform is the creation of 
the Foundation for Civil Society (FCS) a few years ago, following an initiative of several donors. 
It has a substantial budget of several million US $ and supports local NGOs nation-wide with 
small, medium and strategic grants. This aims at strengthening the capacity and voice of the 
civil society in Tanzania. It operates on a very transparent basis and all grants to local CSOs 
can be traced on their homepage. Yet, the organisation is concentrated in Dar es Salaam and a 
continued growth of the portfolio would require its decentralisation. There are many big visible 
NGOs in urban areas but the link with grass root level activities (CBO) in the districts is a big 
(cultural) challenge for most of them. 
Donors emphasise the importance of the watchdog function of CSOs. The Local Government 
Capital Development Fund is being linked to a performance assessment of LGA using criteria 
such as clean audit, orderly procurement, and transparency. Accordingly, it is the CSOs’ task to 
put pressure on the local authorities to improve their performance so that the respective district 
will get access to funding. 
 
3.4 Case studies: Kongwa, Bukoba and Muleba Districts 
The following two pages depict our discussion results in the three districts. 
                                                                                                                                                          
tween vision/goal and reality, between efficiency and effectiveness. It is a technique to understand, 
measure, verify, report and to improve the social performance of the organization 
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Kongwa District Case Study  
 
 
 
 
 
Kongwa District was created in 1996 and has approximately 250’000 inhabitants today. Kongwa 
town is located 10 km from the Dar es Salaam – Dodoma highway, located in the semi - arid high-
lands of central Tanzania. The people suffered from a sever drought in 2005 which resulted in food 
shortage of the staple crops millet and maize. 
          
  Village women         District Commissioner 
Political decentralisation: Kongwa, being a relatively small district, has only one representative in the 
parliament. Out of the 30 district councillors, 29 are from the CCM and one from an opposition party. 
The handing over of additional responsibilities with the LGRP to the district and village has initiated 
an empowerment process not only among the involved government staff but improved participation 
of ordinary citizens in planning, implementation and evaluation of investments. The leaders are now 
under a bigger pressure to deliver what is stipulated in the plan than before. A lot of networking is 
done by the councillors to attract funds from central ministries and donors (which is a main source of 
legitimacy and improves chances of re-election).  
Administrative decentralisation: Every 2-4, months a stakeholder meeting of development partners 
takes place that is open to anybody. Strategic issues are discussed here between the line ministry 
representatives, local authorities, CSOs and citizens. Cooperation between the 61 CSOs and the 
authorities has considerably improved. However, only few of these CSOs are actually operational 
and they are either international NGOs (US-based “Helen Keller International” (health, nutrition) and 
the Italian LVIA (Lay Volunteers International Association) or faith based CSOs that receive donor 
funding. The CSOs submit their budgets to the district authorities, report regularly on their projects, and par-
ticipate in district council meetings when matters of their concern are treated. Whereas budgeting seems to 
be a fairly consolidated matter, the reporting by LGAs to central ministries and individual donors is 
complex and subject to specific donor requirements. 
Last year out of 1’300 primary students that passed class 7, only 760 had secured places in secon-
dary schools. Thus, the villagers built additional classrooms and some additional teachers were 
provided by the ministry. Usually the best teachers at elementary level are promoted for secondary 
level without further studies or students from the university recruited as secondary teachers. Addi-
tionally, local civil servants volunteered to teach the students part time. This was presented as an 
example how government staff and ordinary people are now assuming more responsibilities to 
change life in the village through their own initiative.  
Major constraints for effective public services are the lack of mobility (not enough bicycles, cars), the 
need to further train councillors and to further improve the transparency of relations between CSOs 
and the government. The district headquarter does also not yet have e-mail and internet access, 
making coordination work a challenge. 
Fiscal decentralisation: According to the Tanzania Governance Noticeboard, the total budget avail-
able more than trippled between 2001 and 2005 to US $ 2.3 million (see Annex G). Inflation reduced 
the net value by roughly one third in the same period. The local revenue collection continuously 
dropped to zero in 2005. Thus all budgeted revenues were transfer payments from the centre of 
which 75% were for personal emoluments (salaries of staff), 24% for operating costs (electricity, 
fuel, etc.) and 1% for development investments. 
Most funds for development expenditures come from donors through: a) sectoral programmes (e.g. 
agricultural activities), bilateral programmes or NGO activities. These programmes and activities are 
coordinated through a regular “stakeholder forum”. 
The district has received a fourth instalment of more than US $ 100’000 in FY 2005 under the 
LGCDG scheme. This source of revenue was not mentioned for development activities during our 
interview. These grants would certainly increase the room for manoeuvring to address the most 
prominent local problems: water and food security in the district.  
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Swissaid Tanzania: Bukoba and Muleba District Case Study 
The Swiss based NGO "Swissaid" has been managing a grassroots devel-
opment programme in Tanzania since the early nineties. At present, Swis-
said Tanzania is supporting the activities of its local partner groups in three 
areas: Dar-Coast Region; Mtwara and Masasi District in the South (Mwtara 
Region); Ngara, Muleba and Bukoba Districts on Lake Viktoria (Kagera Re-
gion). The two districts of Bukoba and Muleba were visited by Walter Egli 
(member of the Board of Trustees of Swissaid). The main purpose of the 
visit was to gain first-hand impressions on the fieldwork of Swissaid. At the 
same time, the visit provided valuable inputs for the NADEL exploratory 
study on decentralisation and civil society. 
Swissaid's approach aims at promoting self-help groups at the grassroots 
and supporting these groups with training, technical advice, small grants 
and credits. These support services are delivered out of so-called umbrella organisations, which cover 
the groups in a determined geographical area. Representatives of the participating groups govern the 
umbrella organisations. Increasingly the umbrella organisations are successfully mobilizing funds from 
sources other than Swissaid.  
The umbrella organisations have begun forming their own organisation, the Forum of Grassroots Organi-
sations of Tanzania (FOGOTA). The purpose of FOGOTA is to support the umbrella organisations in their 
efforts to mobilize their own funds and in their policy engagement at regional and national level (advo-
cacy, lobbying).  
In the two districts of Bukoba (3 umbrella organisations, 95 groups) and 
Muleba (4 umbrella organisations, 108 groups) the support of Swissaid is 
focused on the following thematic areas: Land tenure for women, diversifica-
tion and improvement of sustainable agricultural production, animal hus-
bandry, environment conservation, handicraft and carpentry, trade, HIV/AIDS  
The success of the projects was not only visible observing the state of agricul-
tural plantations, animals or reforestations. The groups also confirmed these 
positive impressions by expressing their satisfaction with the economic impact 
of the projects. An obvious impact of the many years of continuous work with 
the groups is the empowerment of the villagers, especially women who are 
assuming positions of responsibility within their groups and in the umbrella 
organisations. A considerable number of members of Swissaid or FOGOTA 
groups have been elected into village or district councils. Officials of the dis-
trict administration of Muleba emphasised the importance of grassroots or-
ganisations such as FOGOTA as partners for local government. 
Another important result of Swissaid's continuous presence is the capacity of 
the umbrella organisations to organise and deliver services such as training, technical advises or micro-
credits to village groups as well as competencies in project cycle management, financial management 
and methodology of participatory approaches and adult education. District officials in Muleba confirmed 
that this capacity represents an invaluable asset in areas where the capacity for service delivery of Local 
Government Authorities is limited.   
Only recently have the umbrella organisations of Swissaid and 
FOGOTA begun to seek a more active involvement in advocacy 
and lobbying activities at local or regional level. For instance, the 
umbrella organisations of Bukoba and Muleba districts are partici-
pating in a CSO network at the level of the Kagera region that tries 
to improve the modalities of service delivery of the regional and 
local health authorities regarding HIV/AIDS testing. 
There seems to be little awareness of the opportunities and poten-
tials offered by decentralisation. While a number of members of 
these groups have been elected as district councillors, the groups as such apparently are not engaged in 
an active dialogue with district authorities. 
Youth Group Engaged in HIV/AIDS 
Awareness Raising 
Swissaid Bukoba Team and 
FOGOTA Umbrella Organisation
Dairy Goats Project
 25 
The role of civil society in decentralisation in Tanzania 
4. Effects on Access to Services, Empowerment and Im- 
 pact on Poverty 
4.1  Effects on Access to Services 
Generally, all representatives from the government and CSOs have stressed the fact that ac-
cess to basic services has improved, although at a somewhat slower pace in rural areas. How-
ever, opinions differed on whether this was up to expectations and up to the desired quality 
standards. In the context of this exploratory study, it was not possible to analyse specific 
changes in access to services at district level. The following table provides some selected but 
aggregated trends on access to services: 
 
Access to services (examples) 
Indicator 1990 2000 2005 
Net primary school enrolment % ca. 50 59 95 
No. of primary teachers na 105,000 135,000 
Teacher pupil ratio primary 1:37* 1:37 1:56 
Teacher pupil ratio secondary 1:17* 1:20 1:22 
Urban water supply coverage** % 67 (87) 70 (90) 73 (85) 
Rural water supply coverage** 43 (35) 50 (46) 53 (42) 
* 1995 
** Reported by Ministry (Reported by Survey/census) 
Source: Poverty Brief, DP Poverty Monitoring Group, and URT (2006) 
Access to services has most spectacularly increased in education but the teacher to pupil ratio 
has deteriorated since the number of students has increased much faster than the number of 
teachers, with substantial regional variation (some schools have 80 and more pupils per 
teacher). 
The lower ministerial figures in access to drinking water in urban areas are explained by the 
circumstance that private sources (boreholes) are not registered and many households obtain 
water from their neighbours. Explanations for the declining trends in access to water in rural 
areas are not given. However, disparities in access to water in rural districts are enormous, 
ranging from 4 % (Sikonge) to 82 % (Arumeru). It is this rather huge divide of access or quality 
of services that are specifically addressed by advocacy CSOs and (opposition) parliamentari-
ans. 
The LGRP assesses the performance of each district. The following graph shows the relation 
between the governance performance (using the rating for 2003) and the net primary enrolment 
ratio for the ten best and ten last districts that participated in the LGRP scheme (38 in 2003). 
One would assume a positive correlation between the governance scoring in a district with its 
primary education level. This brief analysis reveals that there is no significant difference (corre-
lation) discernible between the ten best performing district councils and the ten lowest perform-
ing. The correlation among the ten best performing councils is marginally negative (-0.2), 
whereas the correlation among the ten lower performing councils is slightly positive (0.12, see 
Annex G). That would not yet provide evidence that better governance has improved access to 
primary education as a result of decentralisation in a sector that has seen a substantial expan-
sion of services during the past years. But any conclusions on such a selective basis might be 
premature and risky because the analysis a) would have to include access to other basic ser-
vices (secondary education, health, roads, etc), b) would have to include a time series analysis 
in order to capture the effects of decentralisation related capacity building effects (e.g. changes 
between 2002 and 2005), and c) such changes are the outcome of behavioural changes in 
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planning and implementation of projects at district and lower levels and impacts having a time 
lag in order to be shown in statistics. 
 Governance Scoring and Net Primary 
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Figure:  Relation between the governance scoring of district councils (2003) with net  
  primary enrolment in 2004 (see also Annex G). 
 
There is substantial data available at the district level (though of varying reliability) and the 
analysis of the progress of decentralisation with changes in access to services would reveal 
explanations whether the decentralisation process has contributed to better services or not. 
Similarly, such an analysis should include the changes in activity levels of CSOs in the districts 
in order to assess the extent to which CSOs have contributed to improved access. Such an 
analysis was beyond the scope of this study but could be the topic of further research. 
 
 
4.2  Effects on Empowerment 
All the interview partners, from government and the civil society organisations, have empha-
sised that the Local Governance Reform Programme and the subsequent bottom up planning 
process has contributed to empowerment processes: 
 Participatory decision making and for the first time prioritisation of development invest-
ments at local level were introduced through the LGRP and related sectoral reforms 
(e.g. In education) 
 Improved coordination and transparency of activities that are implemented by the vari-
ous stakeholders at local level 
 Ordinary citizens are now much less shy to express their views and raise questions. 
They are more aware about their roles and responsibilities in contributing to better basic 
services (education, health, water and agriculture) 
 A significant diversification of the CSO and community based organisations has taken 
place and a much intensive role in the policy dialogue at the district level can be ob-
served 
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 Increased pool of ministerial field staff who were key agents for the positive changes 
achieved at the local level. 
Yet, the expectations about achievements were very high and the evaluation in 2004 concluded 
that “over-ambitious targets, national and local elections, coordination issues with other reforms 
and delays in putting the necessary legislation in place” meant that progress in implementing 
the D-by-D reform was considerably slower than originally anticipated. Staff responsible for the 
decentralisation process seemed fairly self-critical during our interviews; especially the possibil-
ity to get the real commitment of the other line ministries was seen as critical bottleneck. 
A critical factor that was mentioned by the interview partners is the role of the donors, being it 
bi- and multilateral donors or international NGOs. Given the high amount of aid (approximately 
50 % of the government budget) and the trend to channel aid through budget support bears the 
risk that the role of CSOs does not grow correspondingly. Their influence could growth again if 
they are capable to compete for service delivery or capacity building contracts that will become 
a feature of budget support at the district level.  
It seems that there is a corresponding shift towards budget support with the CSOs, though on a 
much smaller scale than in the case of the government. Some donors shift towards more 
budget financing and programme financing for CSOs. Overall, it seems that the CSOs play a 
prominent role in balancing the government at local level as complementary service providers or 
as oversight body. The big public budget expansion will put many CSOs in a complementary 
service delivery role.  
Many of these positive changes in empowerment cannot only be attributed to the LGRP but are 
the result of the broader democratisation and economic liberalisation reforms undertaken since 
1990. In order to increase public awareness about the importance of the LGRP, the government 
introduced a “Local Government Day” which is celebrated on 1st of July starting from 2005. Yet, 
the principles of the decentralisation reform are not much known in the broad public. 
 
4.3  Impact on Poverty 
The first decentralisation era (1972-1984) was characterized by an effort to de-concentrate cen-
tral authorities to the local level with the effect that central government controlled everything 
down to the village level and ended in a socio-economic disaster (deterioration of on infrastruc-
ture and a rapidly falling standard of living). The recent decentralisation era (since 2000) is now 
characterized by the devolution of authority to the Local Governments that were re-introduced 
some 25 years ago. And what are the effects this time? 
There has not been much systematic analysis about the impact of decentralisation and the role 
of the civil society on poverty in Tanzania. Ngware (2005) was exploring whether the LGRP is 
impacting positively on the lives of the Tanzanians. The exploratory paper concluded that it has 
indeed made a positive difference (e.g. introduction of equitable and transparent transfer of 
revenues and capital development grants from the centre, integration of administrative staff into 
the LGA administration, strengthening of the local democratic institutions, etc). However, the 
report states that the evidence is based on the conviction of the authors and not on empirical 
data. Thus the report is not based on directly observed and tangible evidence but was rather 
based on declared aims of the LGRP. 
What is certain is that the present decentralisation era coincides with a) a relatively robustly 
growing economy, b) a set of major policy reforms that are implemented as a package and c) a 
stronger and more vocal civil society compared to earlier decentralisation efforts. The following 
table summarises the poverty incidence. However, there is no attempt made to relate these 
changes to any of the above shifts in the policy framework. 
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Economic Growth and Poverty Incidence 
% of population below basic needs poverty line / 
share of population 
1991 2001 2006 
Rural areas  41 / 82 39 / 79 31* / na 
Urban areas 
a) Dar es Salaam 
b) Other urban areas 
 
28 / 5 
29 / 13 
 
18 / 7 
26 / 14 
14* / na 
Average annual GDP growth 2.5 (90-94) 4.0 (95-99) 5.8 (00-04) 
* projection  
Source: URT (2005) Poverty and Human Development Report 
The accelerated growth since 1994 has positively impacted on poverty in Tanzania as shown in 
the 2001 data. The data also clearly shows that the poverty reduction is mainly taking place in 
the capital of Dar es Salaam, whereas effective poverty reduction in rural and other urban areas 
was moderate, despite impressive agricultural growth. The poverty elasticity is clearly in favour 
of urban areas: 1 % of economic growth reduces poverty by 1.3 % in rural and 2.6 % in urban 
areas where poverty is often not very deep. In order to reach the MDGs of halving poverty by 
2015 would require an average growth of 6 %, in order to reach the more ambitious Mkukuta 
target of halving poverty by 2010 will even require an average growth of 8 % per year. 
The challenge is to reduce the poverty rates in rural areas. This can only be achieved if agricul-
tural development perspectives for the millions of smallholders producing mainly for self-
sufficiency can be sustainably improved. Civil society, especially producer organisations in form 
of commodity specific organisations, producer cooperatives or integrated producer schemes 
need to play a more important role in future than today. The government should provide clear 
guidance on how to optimize the cooperation between Local Government Authorities and the 
CSOs towards this aim. 
Within this study it was not possible to correlate district level data in order to assess whether 
successful decentralisation and increased participation of civil society organisations in planning, 
budgeting and expenditure reviews has positively impacted in poverty reduction. The planned 
budget and household survey foreseen for 2006 in the Mkukuta Monitoring Master plan will pro-
vide a basis to compare the income data of districts with the governance performance11 under 
the D-by-D decentralisation between 2001 and 2005. However, there would be the challenge to 
develop a methodology to measure the participation/influence of CSOs at the local level. 
 
 
                                                
11  The LGRP monitors the governance benchmark of the districts through a set of 222 indicators which have 
been unchanged since 2001. 
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5. Conclusions and the Role of Development Cooperation 
The conclusions shall be presented in the form of strong and weak factors about the role of the 
civil society in pro-poor decentralisation in Tanzania 
Achievements so far: 
1. Decentralisation reform (D-by-D) in Tanzania, which started de facto only in 2000 is em-
bedded in a broader reform agenda and in line with the Mkukuta strategy, the national 
poverty reduction strategy (2005). The reform has benefited from the gradual economic 
and political liberalisations that started almost 20 years ago which seem to be irreversi-
ble by now. This process happened concurrently with a broadening and deepening of 
the civil society which has an important role as service deliverer (especially in rural ar-
eas) and to advocate rights of citizens. 
2. The D-by-D reform has its undisputed success in the bottom-up planning process that 
was introduced country wide. Known under the “opportunities and obstacles to devel-
opment” approach (O&OD) it combines a variety of participatory approaches for need 
based planning.  
3. The Local Governance Reform together with the other steps of economic and political 
liberalisation have fostered a new sense of responsibilities and ownership at the local 
level. This has created a feeling of “they know that they are equal” among participants in 
village, ward and district level planning (as it was expressed by a District Commis-
sioner). 
4. Transparency of governance and transparency of the cooperation between the govern-
ment (at all levels) and the civil society has steadily improved. The civil society is seen 
as a complementary partner for development activities and also its (critical) role as over-
sight institution is accepted as long as critical statements are supported by constructive 
recommendations. Though some NGOs were at the point of prohibition, counter pres-
sure from media, intellectuals etc. have strengthened the role of civil society organisa-
tions. 
5. The change in fund managements as a result of fiscal decentralisation has empowered 
local authorities (councils). The transfer of funds and spending responsibiities to the vil-
lage level has improved transparency and accountability, but tracking of local expendi-
tures remains a challenge. 
6. There is a broad consensus that the decentralisation efforts through the LGRP and 
through reforms in line ministries have brought better services closer to the poor people 
(e.g. primary school enrolment is almost 95 % now and access to rural water supply has 
increased from 43 % in 1990 to 53 % in 2005). Yet, the deficiencies in quantity and qual-
ity of services in education, water, health and roads at local level are still enormous. 
7. The recently introduced Local Government Capital Development Grant increases the 
discretionary resources available at local level. Although this is funded through a World 
Bank loan it might reduce the overwhelming dependency of local districts from donors 
and civil society organisations in addressing local problems with development invest-
ments. 
These are clear signs that a change in the mindsets of people about the importance and role of 
local government and civil society and citizens has started. However, decentralisation process 
has not progressed as rapidly as expected in 1998 and the following challenges remain: 
 
1. The lack of skilled and experienced staff at regional and district level within line minis-
tries and local authorities, the often rather low education background of councillors and 
among leaders and members of the civil society requires additional capacity building ef-
forts. The principle of democratic change means that due to the functional rotation such 
capacity building efforts will have to become a built-in factor of the development process. 
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2. The extremely limited financial resources at local level bear the risk, that bottom-up 
plans based on felt needs cannot be implemented within a reasonable time span and 
that the participatory planning process loses its credibility. The scarce resources and the 
political pressure to satisfy many constituencies increase the risk of a piecemeal ap-
proach contradicting the need to focus investments to strategic problems (e.g. education 
quality at secondary level). 
3. The abolition of local (rural) taxes makes sense from the perspective of poverty allevia-
tion and administrative cost-effectiveness. However, dependency from central transfers 
has increased and most decisions on taxes are taken by the centre without broad con-
sultation process. This reduces local ownership and the incentive to implement cost-
effective projects at local level (especially in towns with a potential for a broader and 
growing tax base). 
4. The civil society sector is still at its infancy stage, despite the emergence of national um-
brella organisations. Financial dependency from donors is enormous, correspondingly 
influencing the flexibility to readjust strategies. Service delivery oriented organisations 
play a vital role in strengthening access of poor people to social services. Advocacy ori-
ented civil society organisations play an increasingly important role in urban areas with a 
growing middle income class, while they are still at an initial stage in rural areas. 
5. The additional Local Government Capital Development Grants available for the districts 
that qualify, offer unprecedented scope for investments decided for by the LGA but bear 
the risk that scarce resources are wasted in inefficient investments and funds are mis-
used if no adequate control measures are put in place: technical and financial expertise 
at local level has to be improved, and independent auditing and public expenditure track-
ing surveys should become the routine rather than the exception. 
6. The administrative decentralisation has seen a setback when the Public Service Reform 
has allocated the powers of appointment, confirmation of appointments and promotion of 
local staff to the line ministries (Public Service Regulations 2003). In future, increased 
responsibilities for appointment, promotion and termination of appointments should be 
decentralised to LGAs in order to full comply with D-by-D principle for administrative de-
centralisation. 
7. Presently the centrally appointed executives play a decisive role at regional and district 
level, and often are more experienced and powerful than the elected councillors. In order 
to comply with principles of political decentralisation, the executive at the district level 
should become an elected posting in the mid term. This, however, requires a functioning 
multi-party democracy and the scope of changing majorities.  
 
Decentralisation by devolution can only succeed if simultaneously local government authorities 
and civil society organisations at local and regional level are strengthened. There is a need to 
review the role of CSOs in the light of increasing aid harmonisation allocating more ownership 
and resources to governments. The CSO sector in Tanzania should receive due consideration 
and support should aim at: 
 Strengthening CSO's capacity for participating in policy making at national level through 
the support of independent research organisations, policy networks, advocacy and lob-
bying organisations 
 Capacity building in the field of organisational development, specifically for non-profit 
civil society organisations and social movements 
 Strengthening and supporting participatory service delivery through CSOs in order to 
establish a broad network of community-based organisations (CBOs). 
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Annex A: Conceptual frame and guiding questions 
Decentralisation
6. Poverty
2. Background 
 
• Country specificities (history, 
ethnicities) 
• Size of the country  
• Level of economic deve-
lopment  
• Degree of democracy 
3. Process Design 
 
• Political factors 
(commitment, policy coher-
ence, transparency and par-
ticipation) 
• Administrative factors 
(capacity building, elite cap-
ture and corruption, role of 
central state) 
• Fiscal factors (tax base, 
transfer payments) 
 
 
Determi-
nants of 
pro-poor 
decentrali-
sation 
4. Access to  
services
5. Empowerment 
(capacity of CSOs and local 
government) 
1.Objectives
  impacts on 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure : Model used to formulate the questions (adapted from Jütting 2005). 
 
1) Objectives of decentralisation  
• Does civil society have a stake in defining the objectives of decentralisation and local 
governance reforms? 
• What is the role of civil society organisations assigned to them by the legal decentralisa-
tion framework and declared through official discourse? 
• Does the legal framework support the foundation and work of CSOs? 
 
2) Background 
• General background information on size, social, economical and political aspects of the 
country: What has been the tradition of civic participation in politics?  
• What types of CSOs do exist at local level and what has been their history in local af-
fairs? (political, social or religious background; types of activities; funding; leadership; 
political involvement; etc.)  
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• What is the capacity of CSOs to dialogue with Government and to participate in political 
processes? (service delivery and advocacy)  
• Do CSOs represent the needs and interest of all social and ethnic segments of the 
population?  
 
3) Factors regarding the design of the decentralisation process 
Political factors 
- Commitment to decentralisation 
• To what extent is the government committed to delegate power and responsibilities to 
CSO? Do central and local authorities actively promote civil society participation in de-
centralised public sector management? 
- Internal policy coherence 
• Is decentralisation part of a broader agenda of reforms undertaken by the government 
(economic liberalisation, democratisation reforms,  )?  
• Is there a coherent policy set that supports CSOs in the decentralisation process?  
- Transparent and participative process 
• How well structured is the information flow between CSOs and local government 
agencies (information on activities of local institutions, coordination platform)?  
• Which CSOs participate how effectively in local planning and budgeting and what is 
their role in monitoring, expenditure review and control? (e.g. social auditing)  
• How well does media inform on decentralisation and public policy issues?  
 
Administrative factors 
- Elite capture and corruption 
• Are traditional and modern CSOs dominated by local elites?  
• What is the role of the CSOs to counter corruption and to monitor administrative be-
haviour (inspection; investigating commissions appointed)?  
- Capacity building 
• Does the central government invest in capacity building and/or financial support of 
CSOs? 
- Central / local powers 
• Does the service delivery of CSOs complement the service provision of local govern-
ment agencies and how do they adjust to new public services that were not there be-
fore? 
• How is decentralisation affected by appointees from the central government at local 
level?  
Fiscal factors 
• To what extent do CSOs improve the local tax base (income generation of beneficiar-
ies/members?) 
• Do CSOs lobby for increased transfer of payments for poor regions? 
 
4) Access to services 
• How and to which extent do the CSOs improve incomes in rural areas?  
• Do CSOs bringbasic services (e.g. health, extension) closer to poor people?  
 
5) Empowerment 
• Do CSOs represent and promote the interest of the poor and socially excluded?  
• To which extent does donor support strengthen the local CSOs? 
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• To which extent do CSOs increase the voice of the poor? 
 
6) Poverty impact of decentralisation 
• To which extent do improved access to services and empowered local CSOs contrib-
ute to reduce poverty?  
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Annex B: List of People Met 
Dar es Salaam 
Mrs. Katharina Häberli, SDC, Deputy Country Director 
Mr. Jared Duhu, SDC, National Programme Officer 
Mr. Emmanuel Kazungu, FOGOTA, Secretary General 
Mr. Ally Suedi Kasingo, FOGOTA, Human Resources Officer 
Mrs. Rose Safari, Swissaid Tanzania, Country Director 
Mrs. Mary Mwingira, TANGO, Executive Director 
Mrs. Claire Lhewabura, Project Officer Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
Mrs. Waheeda Shariff Samji, Carpe Diem Ink Consultants 
Mrs. Rehema Tukai, REPOA, Research Coordinator 
Mrs. Joanita Magongo, REPOA, Researcher 
Mr. Paul Sherlock, Embassy of Ireland, Development Specialist 
Mr. Charles Chitinka, PMO-RALG, Human Development Officer 
Mrs. Vera Florida Mugittu, Managing Director Muvek Consultants 
Mrs. Annet Witteveen, Intercooperation Representative 
Dr. Oswald Mashindano, Senior Research Fellow, ESRF 
Mr. John Ulanga, Executive Director, Foundation for Civil Society Dar es Salaam 
Mrs. Mora, Information Officer, World Bank 
 
Dodoma Region 
Mr. Felix Bachmann, Chief Technical Advisor, Intercooperation, Rural Livelihood Development 
Programme 
Mrs. Safia Mbamba-Chuma, Project Officer, RLDC 
Staff of the Rural Livelihood Development Company (RLDC) 
Mr. Yunuev Rugeiyamu, Deputy Regional Administration Secretary 
Mr. Masdom and Mr. Mrichodi, representatives of the Regional Administration Secretariat 
Mr. Shaban Muyombo, District Commissioner, Dodoma Urban 
Mr. Zitto Kabwe, Member of Parliament, Chadema Party 
Mr. Omal Ilyas, free-lance Consultant 
Prof. Batimo Sebyiga, IRDP, Director of Studies 
Prof. Innocent Zilihona, IRDP, Head Department of Research and Consulting 
Mr. Bitegeko B. Claudio, PMO-RALG Dodoma, Director Governance Section 
Mrs. Naomi Sawe, PMO-RALG Dodoma, Senior Town Planner  
Mr. D.V. Toureka, PMO-RALG Dodoma, Economist 
Mr. Lurige S. Andres, PMO-RALG Dodoma, Economist 
Mr. Zawachiel B. Mchome, Regional Commissioner Dodoma Region 
Mr. Musiba, Principle, Training Institute for Local Government, Hombolo 
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Kongwa District 
Mrs. Florence Horombe, District Commissioner, Kongwa District 
Mr. Mashaka Mwenda, Sr. Economist, Planning Department, Kongwa District 
Mr. Anania Bansimbile, Agricultural Field Agent, LVIA 
Mr. Levison Nyanganyi, Microfinance Field Officer, LVIA 
Mr. Ricardo Paloscia, Country Coordinator, LVIA 
Mrs. Simona Conti, Administrator and Microfiance Sector Coordinator, LVIA 
Mr. Japhet Chamgeni, Agricultural Field Animator, LVIA 
Village Secretary Ibwaga Village 
 
Bukoba and Muleba District
Thomas Byarugaba, Programme Officer, Swissaid Tanzania 
District Agricultural Officer, Muleba District 
District Trade Officer, Muleba District 
Leaders of the following FOGOTA and/or Swissaid groups:, Waitu Boresha, Vumilia Butemba, 
Kashangura Tweyambe, Muleju, Muvimawamu, Uhunziasilia, Kimwaka Katunguru, Mwavuli-
Uvibo, Kamachumu, Buhungiro, Tutunyu 
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Annex D: Map of Tanzania 
 
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit 
 
Key Figures 
 Tanzania Kongwa Distr. Bukoba Distr. Muleba Distr. 
Inhabitants (2002) 34.6 million 249,800 395,100 386,300 
% of population below the poverty line (2002) 35 % 40 % 18 % 27 % 
Primary education net enrolment (2004) 91 % 72 % 85 % 86 % 
% of households having electricity 9 % (1999) 1 % (2002) 2% 1% 
Source: Poverty and Human Development Report 2005 
Case study area 
Kongwa District 
Case study area Bukoba 
and Muleba District 
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Annexe E: Governance Structure of Tanzania 
 Executive Legislative Judiciary Civil Society 
     
Central Level Central Government Parliament Court of Appeal 
High Court 
Constitutional Court 
Altogether ca. 4’000 regis-
tered CSOs 
Union of Tanzania 
(Tanzania main-
land and Zanzibar) 
President (elected for a 5 year 
term by popular vote) and Vice-
President (appointed by Pres.), 
President of Zanzibar (elected), 
Prime Minister and Cabinet (30 
Ministers (elected by Parliament)
320 members in total 
232 constituencies 
75 women (quota) plus 
House of Re. Zanzibar (5), 
Attorney General (1) and 
Presidential appointees (max 
10) 
Judges are appointed by 
the President (High Court: 
not less than 15 according 
to constitution) 
A number of umbrella organi-
sations exist: 
- TANGO (ca 800  
   members) 
- TACASODE (ca 600) 
- Policy Forum (ca 60) 
- … 
     
Regional Level Regional Commissioner (RC)  Resident Magistrate’s 
Courts 
n.a. 
26 regions (incl. 5 
in Zanzibar and 
Pemba Islands) 
Appointed by the President    
     
District Level District Commissioner (DC) 
District Executive Director (DED)
District Councils  District Magistrate’s Court Case: Kongwa District (Do-
doma Region) 
22 urban (2 city: 
Dar es Salaam, 
Mwanza; 9 mu-
nicipal and 11 
town) councils and 
94 rural councils 
Both are appointed by the cen-
tral government 
Elected by popular vote (25-
30 councillors representing 
wards) 
Judges are appointed by 
the Chief Justice 
61 registered CSOs, of which 
the most active mentioned 
NGOs are international NGOs 
(LVIA, Helen Keller Inter-
national) or local initiatives 
supported by donors 
(CBHI/SDC) 
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Ward Level  Development Committee Ward tribunals   
  All village chairpersons (Land dispute act)  
     
Village Level Village Executive Director Village Council Primary Court  
10’200 villages Appointed by ……. Between 15 - 25 councillors 
elected by the village assem-
bly 
Judges are appointed by 
the Chief Justice 
 
Note:  
1) The constitution of 1977 mentions three levels of governance: national, district and village 
2) Between Ward and District level is the Divisional Secretariat and below the village is the “vitongoji”, the smallest unit of a village with an elected 
chairman. 
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Annex F:  Governance Indicators Tanzania 
 
Governments and related indices of political rights and civil liberty  
(only years with changes) 
Year President Political rights Civil liberties Status 
1972 Nyerere (72-85) 6 6 Not free 
1990 Mwinyi (85-95) 6 5 Not free 
1994  6 6 Partly free 
1995  5 5 Partly free 
1998 Mkapa (95-05) 5 4 Partly free 
1999  4 4 Partly free 
2003  4 3 Partly free 
2006 Kikwete (05- ..) n.a n.a Partly free 
Source: www.freedomhouse.org
 
 
Source: World Bank: Governance matters IV, updated data and new results for 1996 - 2004 
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Annex G: Tanzania Governance Noticeboard  
(www.http://www.repoa.or.tz/tgn/, data for Dodoma Region, Mio. TSh, rounded) 
 
District Description 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 99-07
        
 Personal Emolument  1,252 1,774 2,142 3,514 6,760 
 Other Charges  40 231 405 761 553 
Development 26 30 36 44 n.a. 
Total Grants 1,318 2,036 2,583 4,319 7,313 
   
Revenue collection 377 417 521 325 n.a. 
Total Budget 1,695 2,505 3,090 4,644 7,313 
Dodoma 
M.C 
Budget Per Capita 
(thousand) 5,200 7,800 9,600 13,400 22’700 + 436 %
        
 Personal Emolument  540 901 1,216 1,910 3,746 
 Other Charges  29 190 392 611 789 
Development 25 24 60 39 n.a. 
Total Grants 594 1,115 1,668 2,560 4,535 
   
Revenue collection 157 121 97 85 n.a. 
Total Budget 750 1,256 1,745 2,644 4,535 
Kongwa 
Budget Per Capita 
(thousamd) 3,000 5,100 7,000 10,600 18,200 + 606 %
Note:  Source: TNG 
 1 mio TSh = US $ 1050 in 2006 
 Italic figures are not rounded to millions 
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Annex H: Governance Scoring and Access to Services  
(Primary Education) 
 
Rank Council Phase1 
Gov. Scoring* 
2003 NPER 2004 Correlation 
1 Bakuba DC x 89 85 -0,20248234 
2 Masasi x 84 90   
3 Kilwa DC x 81 76   
4 Iringa MC x 78 89   
5 Lindi TC x 77 100   
6 Songea DC x 77 100   
7 Tabora MC x 75 86   
8 Mufindi MC  75 100   
9 Bariadi DC  74 80   
10 Mbarari DC  74 86   
… 
29 Shinyanga DC x 66 95 0,12709075 
30 Bunda DC  65 100   
31 Njombe DC  65 99   
32 Bukoba TC  64 96   
33 Bukombe DC  64 81   
34 Kasulu DC x 64 74   
35 Temeke MC x 64 95   
36 Muleba DC  63 86   
37 Musuma TC  63 100   
38 Sumbawanga DC x 63 100   
 * The governance score includes 222 indicators in the following areas: 
  Democracy  20 
  Community participation 27 
  Rule of Law 14 
  Integrity of leaders and workers 27 
  Transparency and accountability 19 
  Executive administrative efficiency 83 
  Gender  mainstreaming 8 
  Planning procedures 5 
  Planning skills/resources available 8 
  Planning interventions 11 
 Source: URT 2004 (Governance score) and Poverty and Human Development Report 2005 (NPER) 
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Annex I: Tanzania at a Glance (World Bank) 
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